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Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s feverishly anticipated decision in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius1 (“the Health Care Decision” 
 
 * Richard Dale Endowed Chair in Law, Professor of Philosophy, The University of Texas at 
Austin.  For extremely helpful comments, challenges, and suggestions, I thank workshop audiences 
at the law schools of DePaul University, the University of Michigan, Florida State University, the 
University of Chicago, Duke University, and the University of Texas.  For especially valuable 
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or “NFIB”) regarding the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (colloquially known as “Obamacare”) produced three 
main holdings concerning two critical provisions of the Act.2  The first two 
holdings concerned the “individual mandate” that requires most Americans 
to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance.  First, a 5–4 majority held 
that this provision exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.3  
Second, a different 5–4 majority held that this same mandate, which requires 
those who fail to secure the minimum required health insurance to pay a tax 
penalty to the IRS, is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing 
authority.4  The third holding concerned “the Medicaid expansion,” which 
expanded the class of persons to whom the states must provide Medicaid 
coverage as a condition for receiving federal funds under the Medicaid 
program.5  By the more lopsided margin of 7–2, the Court struck down this 
provision as an impermissible condition on the provision of federal funds to 
the states.6 
Of these three holdings, the third—concerning what is often called 
Congress’s “conditional spending power”—is apt to have the most far-
reaching consequences beyond health care.  The Court’s Commerce Clause 
ruling was predicated on the fact that, in a majority’s estimation, Congress 
was here imposing an unprecedented affirmative obligation upon individuals 
to enter commerce rather than, as is customary, regulating behavior that was 
already commercial.7  Because Congress could not have been expected to 
impose many—or any—such affirmative obligations even had the dissenters 
prevailed on the Commerce Clause issue, this ruling will likely have little 
future impact.  And Congress rarely needs to resort to its taxing power to 
achieve regulatory ends when it can regulate “directly” on the strength of its 
 
contributions—at these events, in conversation, or by means of written comments on prior drafts—I 
wish to particularly acknowledge David Adelman, Matt Adler, Sam Bagenstos, Joseph Blocher, 
Oren Bracha, Curt Bradley, Curtis Bridgeman, Sam Buell, I. Glenn Cohen, Lee Fennell, Joey 
Fishkin, Andrew Gold, John Golden, Daniel Halberstam, Bernard Harcourt, Don Herzog, Scott 
Hershovitz, Andy Koppelman, Guha Krishnamurthi, Marty Lederman, Sandy Levinson, Dan 
Markel, Richard McAdams, Richard Primus, Jed Purdy, Garrick Pursley, David Rabban, Larry 
Sager, Mark Schankerman, Margo Schlanger, Neil Siegel, Stephen Siegel, Charlie Silver, James 
Spindler, David Strauss, Kevin Toh, and Hannah Wiseman, with apologies to those whom I have 
overlooked.  I am also grateful to Paul Still for timely research assistance. 
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
2. Whether there were three main holdings, more, or fewer, could be quibbled with.  Those who 
see fewer would contend that the first main holding I identify—that the “individual mandate” was 
not a permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce power—is better characterized as dicta in light 
of the Court’s determination that that provision was a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing 
power.  Those who see more would elevate to “main holding” status other rulings in the case, such 
as those concerning the anti-injunction act and severability.  For my purposes, nothing turns on 
these possible disagreements. 
3. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593. 
4. Id. at 2575, 2600 (Roberts, C.J.). 
5. Id. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
6. Id. at 2608 (Roberts, C.J.). 
7. Id. at 2589–90. 
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commerce power.8  So the Court’s relatively expansive interpretation of 
Congress’s taxing power is not of great moment going forward precisely 
because its relatively restrictive interpretation of Congress’s commerce 
power is not.  But Congress makes habitual (a critic might even say 
“profligate”) use of its conditional spending power.9  Accordingly, if, as 
appears to many, the Court has tightened the restrictions on this power, the 
implications could be profound. 
Unfortunately, of the three holdings, the last is not only the most 
potentially significant, but also the one supported by the least clear rationale.  
At first blush, to be sure, the majority’s reasoning seems straightforward.  
The key precedent on which the majority drew, South Dakota v. Dole,10 had 
announced a four-part test governing Congress’s use of its spending power to 
induce state behavior that Congress could not mandate: the spending 
program must promote “the general welfare,” the condition must be 
unambiguous, the condition must be related to the national interests that the 
spending would advance, and the condition may not require state recipients 
to violate the Constitution themselves.11  No Justices in NFIB expressed 
concern that the Medicaid expansion violated any of these limitations. 
In addition to these four restrictions, however, the Dole Court read the 
Spending Clause to impose limits on Congress’s ability to “coerce” the states 
in ways that it could not directly mandate under its other Article I powers.12  
“[I]n some circumstances,” the Court observed, “the financial inducement 
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 
‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”13  It is this prohibition on coercion or 
compulsion that, a majority of the Court concluded, doomed the Medicaid 
expansion.14  While candidly acknowledging that they could provide no 
guidance regarding how the line between inducement and compulsion would 
be assessed going forward, seven Justices nonetheless deemed the 
conditional offer that the Medicaid expansion embodied impermissibly 
coercive because it gave states “no choice” but to accept.15 
That, to repeat, is how things appear at first blush.  As is often the case, 
things look rather less clear on second look.  For several reasons, it is 
uncertain that this “no choice” thesis fully captures the majority’s reasoning.  
 
8. Cf. id. at 2578–79 (stating that Congress uses its taxation power when it cannot directly 
regulate, and contrasting that with its Commerce Clause powers). 
9. See, e.g., Bob Drummond, Limits on Spending Power Seen as Health Ruling’s Legacy, 
BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-01/limits-on-spending-
power-seen-as-health-ruling-s-legacy.html (stating that Congress has used its conditional spending 
power in many areas). 
10. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
11. Id. at 207–08. 
12. Id. at 211.  
13. Id. (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
14. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).  
15. Id. at 2603–04, 2606–07. 
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Among the most important are these.  First, neither opinion that combined to 
constitute the majority on this question—Chief Justice Roberts’s for himself 
and Justices Breyer and Kagan, and the joint opinion of Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito16—disputed Justice Ginsburg’s observation, 
dissenting on this point, that it would be constitutionally permissible for 
Congress to repeal the Medicaid Act in its entirety and then enact a new law 
that mirrored the preexisting law with the Medicaid expansion.17  Yet if the 
states had no choice but to accede to the Medicaid expansion, it is hard to see 
why they would have any more choice but to accede to this new hypothetical 
Medicaid Act.  Second, several passages from the Roberts opinion hint that 
the constitutional vice was not exactly that states had no real choice other 
than to accept, but rather that Congress had an impermissible purpose in 
crafting this particular conditional proposal.18 
Given the vast potential significance of the Court’s holding on 
conditional spending and the manifest lack of clarity regarding its rationale, a 
comprehensive and critical assessment of this holding is urgent.  That is the 
ambition of this Article. 
The Article advances many claims, some with conviction, others more 
tentatively.  Ruthlessly simplified, the core theses are these.  First, insofar as 
the majority rested its holding of unconstitutionality on the ground that the 
amount of funds that a state would lose by not agreeing to the condition was 
so great as to compel the states to accept, that is a highly dubious rationale.  
Second, it does not necessarily follow that the Court’s bottom-line 
conclusion was wrong.  A more promising rationale for that conclusion 
would be the one merely hinted at by the Chief Justice: Congress’s threat to 
withhold all Medicaid funds from a state if it did not agree to provide for a 
new class of beneficiaries would constitute the constitutional wrong of 
coercion if animated or infected by a bad purpose.  Taken together, then, the 
first and second points are these: compulsion and coercion are not the same 
things, and the constitutional wrong that conditional spending offers more 
plausibly instantiate is that of coercion, not of compulsion. 
Third, the basic principles that govern whether a conditional spending 
offer from the national government to the states is unconstitutionally 
coercive are not particular to the conditional spending context.  Instead, they 
lie at the heart of a general solution to the ubiquitous puzzle of 
 
16. That joint opinion was styled a dissent.  But on the particular question on which I am 
focusing—whether Congress may constitutionally threaten to withhold all Medicaid funding on a 
state’s refusal to accept federal funds to provide Medicaid coverage to a new class of 
beneficiaries—the votes of these four “dissenters” were necessary to constitute a majority.  
Accordingly, I will refer to the opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito as “the joint 
opinion.”  Given this Article’s focus, I reserve the term “dissent” for the opinion by Justice 
Ginsburg, writing only for herself and Justice Sotomayor on this point. 
17. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
18. See id. at 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.) (discussing Congress’s purpose of using the Medicaid 
expansion to drastically expand coverage and essentially recreate Medicaid). 
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“unconstitutional conditions”—that is, the puzzle regarding whether and 
under what circumstances it is constitutionally permissible for government to 
condition a benefit on an offeree’s exercising or not exercising its 
constitutional rights in some preferred way.19  Fourth, application of these 
general “trans-substantive” principles to the instant case suggests that the 
Medicaid expansion probably was coercive and therefore the Court was 
probably right—though not for the reasons it gave—to hold that that 
provision exceeds our best understanding of constitutional limits on 
Congress’s power.20 
These four theses are developed over five parts.  Part I unpacks the 
arguments advanced in the two opinions that together made up a majority on 
the Spending Clause question and elucidates the key concepts upon which 
much of the analyses in the body of the Article will rely—namely, coercion, 
and compulsion.  (Following convention, I will underline these words when I 
am invoking the concepts and when I think that, given the context, a 
reminder will be useful.)  This Part shows that the majority on this point 
effectively interpreted what the joint opinion terms “the anti-coercion 
principle”21 in Spending Clause jurisprudence as an “anti-compulsion 
principle”—that is, as a rule that disables Congress from inducing the states 
to act in accord with the wishes of the national government by offering 
benefits on terms that the states could not, as a practical matter, reject. 
Part II casts doubt on the soundness of such a rule.  Contract law, on 
which the Chief Justice and the joint opinion both rely, does not offer the 
support they claim.  Very likely, the best argument for it is the one advanced 
by the state challengers to the Act.  Without meaningful limits on Congress’s 
spending power, they argued, federalism-based limits on Congress’s other 
powers “would be for naught.”22  Therefore, “a judicially enforceable outer 
limit on Congress’s power to use federal tax dollars to coerce States is . . . a 
constitutional necessity.”23  There is merit to that argument.  But it does not 
quite support the conclusion drawn.  A judicially enforceable limit on 
 
19. The heart of a general solution, but not the entirety of it: a conditional offer that does not 
amount to coercion might be unconstitutional on other grounds.  Coercion is the distinctive, but not 
the sole, constitutional wrong that conditional offers might instantiate.  See generally Mitchell N. 
Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 1 (2001). 
20. This conclusion takes as a given the correctness of the anti-commandeering decisions, New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  I am 
sympathetic to the suggestion that the best understanding of our constitutional order would leave 
Congress with more authority to mandate behavior by the states than current case law allows.  But 
this Article analyzes Spending Clause jurisprudence under the assumption that Congress could not 
mandate state participation in the Medicaid program. 
21. The joint opinion deploys this term unhyphenated.  I have taken the liberty of inserting a 
hyphen because doing so makes it easier to distinguish visually the two construals of this principle 
that I identify. 
22. Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 20, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(No. 11-400). 
23. Id. 
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Congress’s ability to coerce the states through conditional spending grants 
need not assume the form of an anti-compulsion rule given the availability of 
an anti-coercion rule instead.  Indeed, as Part II further shows, constitutional 
doctrines outside the spending context strengthen the appeal of an anti-
coercion principle while undermining the plausibility of an anti-compulsion 
principle.  Part III seeks to make readers more receptive to a true anti-
coercion principle, and to mitigate objections from the church of stare 
decisis, by developing the claim, already noted, that the Roberts opinion 
actually flirts with this alternative construal of the critical principle. 
Part IV—the longest and most complex part of the Article—examines 
whether the conditional offer embodied in the Medicaid expansion 
constitutes impermissible coercion.  Because, as noted above, I believe that 
the conditional spending problem is, in critical respects, just an instance of 
the more general problem of “unconstitutional conditions,” the first task of 
this Part is to develop and defend a general account of the circumstances in 
which it can be unconstitutionally coercive for government to offer 
“benefits” on condition that the offeree not exercise one of its constitutional 
rights.24  That general account centers on a denial of the oft-stated and widely 
held belief that, if a rightholder (be it an individual or a state) is not entitled 
to some particular boon, then government may withhold it for any reason at 
all without offending the Constitution.  To the contrary, I argue, government 
unconstitutionally penalizes the exercise of a right if it withholds a benefit 
for certain bad purposes or reasons.  In other words, I challenge the 
conventional scholarly wisdom that maintains that the concept of penalty is 
incoherent or normatively inert.  The Part’s second task, accordingly, is to 
apply that general account to the Medicaid expansion.  In concluding 
(tentatively) that the statute runs afoul of general principles regarding 
coercion and penalty, Part IV, in effect, returns to critics of the Medicaid 
expansion what Part II had taken away. 
Part V considers objections, and articulates refinements, to my general 
analysis of coercive offers—including the general analysis of penalties—and 
to the application of that account to the Medicaid expansion.25  That final 
Part will underscore a point that warrants emphasis at the outset: I present the 
analyses that follow not as a watertight argument in support of a single 
“bottom-line” conclusion, but as a framework for analyzing conditional 
offers by the state—a framework that is filled out more fully and confidently 
 
24. An account could be “general,” though not universal or exceptionless.  See infra Part V, 
Objection 4. 
25. For an early presentation of some of the ideas developed here, see my comments posted to 
the blog Balkinization while NFIB was pending.  Mitch Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the 
ACA, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 6, 2012, 3:49 AM) http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/04/coercion-
compulsion-and-aca.html; Mitch Berman, More on Unconstitutional Conditions and the ACA, 
BALKINIZATION (Apr. 8, 2012, 10:05 AM) http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/04/more-on-
unconstitutional-conditions-and.html.  I am very grateful to Sandy Levinson for prodding me to post 
on the topic and to Jack Balkin for providing an excellent forum for a productive exchange. 
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here, sketched more thinly or tentatively there.  Readers who end up rejecting 
my (avowedly uncertain) judgment that the Medicaid expansion was 
unconstitutionally coercive need not, for that reason alone, reject in toto the 
machinery I propose.  The analysis that follows consists of a fair number of 
moving parts.  They do not all stand or fall together. 
I. Of Coercion and Compulsion 
Those portions of the three opinions that address whether it is 
constitutional for Congress to threaten to withhold all of a state’s Medicaid 
funding for existing beneficiaries (the blind, the disabled, the elderly, 
pregnant women, and needy families with dependent children) unless it 
accepts new funding, with associated conditions, for a new class of 
beneficiaries (adults, including those without children, with incomes up to 
133% of the federal poverty level) are long, totaling over fifty pages 
together.  Despite their combined length, however, one single theme leaps 
out most plainly: this case seemingly turns, for all the Justices, on a vice they 
call “coercion.” Both the Roberts opinion and the joint opinion squarely 
conclude both that this particular condition is unconstitutional because it is 
“coercive” or constitutes impermissible “coercion,” and that what makes this 
so is that it leaves the states with “no real choice” but to accept.  Making 
clear that this is how she reads the majority,26 Justice Ginsburg objects that 
“[t]he coercion inquiry . . . appears to involve political judgments that defy 
judicial calculation.”27 
Accordingly, the first step toward understanding the grounds of, and 
possible difficulties with, the Court’s reasoning in support of its Spending 
Clause holding must be to get clear on just what the Court means by 
“coercion.” 
A. Conceptual and Terminological Preliminaries 
Anyone familiar with Supreme Court case law on conditional spending 
prior to NFIB will have noticed this striking feature: the Court routinely uses 
the terms “coercion” and “compulsion” in a loose fashion, sometimes 
treating them as synonyms, sometimes not, and never carefully defining 
either. 
Take, to start, the very brief passage from Dole in which the Court 
appears to proscribe conditions “so coercive as to pass the point at which 
‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”28  Although this passage is routinely 
read—including by Chief Justice Roberts and by the authors of the joint 
opinion—to prohibit “coercion,” its literal import is to proscribe 
“compulsion,” the overwhelming implication being that coercive offers that 
 
26. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2639–40 & n.24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
27. Id. at 2641. 
28. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
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do not amount to compulsion are permissible.  That is just a single passage, 
so should not be over-read were it unusual.  In fact, though, the failure 
carefully to distinguish coercion from compulsion is entirely representative 
of the case law.29 
That Supreme Court Spending Clause opinions fail to distinguish 
between coercion and compulsion in any analytically satisfactory manner is 
further evidenced by a glance at the work of the best constitutional lawyers.  
For a striking illustration, consider the principal brief filed by the state 
challengers in the health care litigation, authored by former Solicitor General 
Paul Clement.  From Dole’s declaration that an exercise of Congress’s 
spending power would violate the Constitution if it were “so coercive as 
to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’” that brief 
draws the lesson that “Congress may not use its spending power 
coercively.”30  It also deems “the coercion doctrine” violated on the 
grounds that “the ACA . . . compels the States to act in ways that 
Congress could not compel directly.”31  Further examples of the brief’s 
apparent conflation of coercion and compulsion could be multiplied with 
ease: these few passages are all culled from a single page.32 
Chief Justice Roberts endorses the very same conflation of coercion 
and compulsion, or equivocation between them, when stating the issue: 
The States . . . contend that the Medicaid expansion exceeds 
Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause.  They claim that 
Congress is coercing the States to adopt the changes it wants by 
threatening to withhold all of a State’s Medicaid grants, unless the 
State accepts the new expanded funding and complies with the 
conditions that come with it.  This, they argue, violates the basic 
principle that the “Federal Government may not compel the States to 
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”33 
This pattern of usage is frequently a strong indication that the speaker or 
author lacks a firm grasp on the precise idea or concept she is groping for.  
She has a rough sense of the idea, or knows the vicinity, but hasn’t nailed it 
down.  I don’t mean this as a biting criticism.  It is hard work always to 
identify the precise concept that we have dimly or loosely in mind, and not 
 
29. See, e.g., Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 687 (1999) (quoting Dole’s “point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion’” passage, and 
then concluding that “the point of coercion is automatically passed—and the voluntariness of 
waiver destroyed—when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from 
otherwise lawful activity” (emphasis added)). 
30. Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 27, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11–400) (emphasis added). 
31. Id. (emphasis added). 
32. Id. 
33. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, at 188 (1992)) (emphases added). 
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always worth the effort.  Not infrequently, the loose grasp is good enough for 
our purposes. 
But not infrequently it isn’t.  And that is what should worry us here.  If 
the words “coercion” and “compulsion” are not synonymous, but rather 
capture or are best associated with different concepts, then we cannot tolerate 
looseness or imprecision in any case in which the two pull apart.  When 
confronting any conditional offer that plausibly coerces the states to accept 
without compelling acceptance or conversely, any offer that subjects the 
states to compulsion but not to coercion, it becomes essential to identify 
which is the constitutional wrong—coercion or compulsion, or perhaps the 
union of the two, or something else entirely—and then to carefully establish 
that the features of the program or provision under review make out the 
concept that is constitutionally significant and not the related concept that 
might be constitutionally irrelevant. 
In the remainder of this section, I aim to establish that coercion and 
compulsion are different concepts.  This is a modest claim.  To forestall 
possible misunderstanding, I should emphasize that I am not offering 
definitions of the words “coercion” and “compulsion.”  I am offering 
accounts of two distinct concepts to which I am affixing the distinct words 
“coercion” and “compulsion” as handy labels.  Of course, I do believe that 
the ordinary meanings of the words correspond closely enough to the 
concepts as I demarcate them to make it reasonable to employ these words 
and not others.  I hope and rather expect that readers will share those 
judgments.  But please keep in mind that our goal here is to focus on the 
concepts rather than the words.  I am trying to make two concepts, and the 
respects in which they are different, tolerably clear.  If you understand the 
concepts to which I will refer by the words “coercion” and “compulsion,” 
then the argumentative uses to which I will put these concepts will not be 
jeopardized if you also harbor doubts about the extent to which you would 
define our existing words “coercion” and “compulsion” to match the 
concepts as I roughly describe them.  (Similarly, although I think I am 
offering accounts of two distinct concepts, I believe that nothing turns on 
whether you share that judgment.  If you believe that I am misdescribing the 
concepts that I am calling “coercion” and “compulsion,” you may treat the 
two phenomena that I distinguish as simply that—phenomena.  The 
important questions will turn out to be whether the fact, if true, that a 
conditional spending offer instantiates this or that phenomenon warrants the 
judgment that the conditional offer is constitutionally problematic.  What are 
the best accounts of the concepts of coercion or compulsion should not 
distract us.) 
Coercion is generally thought to be a type of wrong.  It’s something that 
we presumptively ought not to engage in, and that properly subjects us to 
1292 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:1283 
 
criticism, censure or, at a minimum, a demand for justification, if we do.34  
Of course, there are many and diverse types of wrongs.  To a first 
approximation, coercion is the wrong of exerting wrongful pressure on a 
subject to do as the coercer wishes.35  And the usual way in which one puts 
wrongful pressure on a target’s choices is by threatening to wrong him if he 
does not comply with the threatener’s “demand” or “condition.”36  Roughly, 
then, a threat is coercive, or constitutes coercion, if it would be wrongful for 
the threatener to carry it out.37 
Compulsion, in contrast, is not a wrong—at least not all by itself.  It is a 
description, if possibly a normatively freighted one, of certain circumstances 
of action, namely those in which, for one reason or another, our choices are 
very substantially constrained.38  Again to a first approximation, one is 
compelled to do such-and-such, or is subject to compulsion, when there is 
some coherent sense in which one could not have done otherwise.  
Compulsion can be produced in various ways.  For example, it can be the 
product of extremely powerful irrational urges, like those arising from 
addiction or other forms of mental disorder.39  Alternatively, it can be the 
product of rational pressure to pursue the course of action that powerfully 
dominates all alternatives in a severely circumscribed choice set.40  
Depending on other factors, the descriptive fact that one has acted in the face 
of compulsion may or may not serve, normatively, to make out a type of 
excusatory or mitigating condition.41  In short, compulsion is a state of affairs 
to which, ideally, we would not be subject, and that, when present, can 
potentially ground relief from responsibility or liability. 
Again, these are first-pass accounts of the two concepts.  Either or both 
might benefit from refinement.  For our purposes, though, exquisite precision 
 
34. Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45, 
47 (2002). 
35. Id. 
36. See Martin Gunderson, Threats and Coercion, 9 CAN. J. PHIL. 247, 248 (1979) (describing 
dispositional coercion as involving “the threat of sanctions”). 
37. This is the dominant understanding in the philosophical literature.  For overviews, see Scott 
Anderson, Coercion, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2011), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/coercion; William A. Edmundson, Coercion, in 
THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 451 (Andrei Marmour ed., 2012).  
Important works that defend and develop this claim include ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 
(1987); Gunderson, supra note 36; and Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals [Rawls and Gandhi], 4 
POL. THEORY 65, 68–70 (1976).  For my contribution to the general philosophical literature, see 
generally Berman, supra note 34. 
38. See Robert Audi, Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion, 11 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 3 
(1974) (suggesting that people who act with limited choices may be acting with less freedom); see 
also Vincent Brümmer, On Not Confusing Necessity with Compulsion: A Reply to Paul Helm, 31 
RELIGIOUS STUD. 105, 105–06 (1995) (suggesting that choice can be limited by factual 
circumstances without destroying freedom of choice). 
39. See Audi, supra note 38, at 5 (illustrating that internal compulsions such as obsessions, 
phobias, and irresistible impulses can lead to unavoidable actions). 
40. Matt Zwolinski, Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 689, 701 (2007). 
41. Id. 
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is not essential.  These provisional accounts are sufficient to establish the 
critical point that these are distinct concepts.  And that claim is demonstrated 
by the fact that there exists both compulsion-without-coercion and coercion-
without-compulsion. 
Here’s just one quick example of compulsion-without-coercion.  Law 
student, L, accepts a job with a firm that represents clients to whom L 
strenuously objects or that, in any other fashion, runs contrary to important 
principles or values of L’s.  L wouldn’t accept the job but for the facts that it 
is L’s only offer and that L has very substantial loan obligations.  L can 
properly answer, in response to the charge that she has compromised her 
principles, that she “was compelled” to do so or “had no choice.”  
Nonetheless, L wasn’t “coerced into” accepting the job and nobody—not the 
firm or anybody else—is properly charged with coercion. 
And here’s an example of coercion-without-compulsion: T, a thug, 
threatens H with some moderate violence—say, a broken finger—unless H 
turns over his briefcase.  H complies.  Unbeknownst to T, the briefcase 
contains most of H’s and W’s savings.  When H returns home and reports the 
robbery, H’s spouse, W, is aghast.  “How could you possibly have given up 
all our funds for Junior’s education?!”  W demands.  If H responds that he 
“was compelled to do so” or “had no choice,” W could be right (depending 
upon the details, of course) to reject the claim.  H was not compelled to give 
up that money.  Given the threat he faced, H should have run or resisted.  Yet 
T did engage in coercion.  T didn’t merely try to coerce H, for he did, after 
all, succeed.  Assuming that T threatened H with unpleasantness that T was 
wrong to threaten but that H could have endured and should have under the 
circumstances, T coerced H into giving up his money, though H wasn’t 
compelled to do so.42 
Naturally, countless interactions amount to both coercion and 
compulsion—what we might term either coercion-through-compulsion or 
compulsion-by-coercion.  “Your money or your life” is a paradigm.  That is 
to be expected because coercive proposals are intended to induce compliance 
with a condition or demand, and the issuer of the proposal—the coercer—
understands that success in this aim is a function of the pressure that the 
target of the coercion experiences, and not the bare wrongness of the 
consequence threatened.43  But the key point is that coercion and compulsion 
are analytically distinct and can and do come apart in the real world.  
 
42. In response to Justice Ginsburg’s observation that it would cost states little to accept the 
Medicaid expansion, Chief Justice Roberts objected that “the size of the new financial burden 
imposed on a State is irrelevant in analyzing whether the State has been coerced into accepting that 
burden.  ‘Your money or your life’ is a coercive proposition, whether you have a single dollar in 
your pocket or $500.”  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 n.12 (2012) 
(Roberts, C.J.).  He is quite right.  My point here is that “Your money or I’ll break your arm” is also  
“a coercive proposition.”  But depending upon the context it might not be one that amounts to 
compulsion. 
43. Gunderson, supra note 36, at 253–54. 
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Coercion and compulsion are both characterizations of features of events in 
which one agent exerts pressure on another to do as the first agent wishes.  
At the risk of some simplification, compulsion is constituted by the amount 
of pressure and coercion is constituted by its character. 
The critical question, therefore, is this: In the context of constitutional 
challenges to the Medicaid provisions of the ACA (and in the spending 
context more generally, and—just possibly—in other conditional offer 
contexts more generally still), which is or should be the operative concept—
coercion or compulsion?  This question cannot be answered by simply 
pointing out that “it’s called ‘the anti-coercion principle,’ stupid.”  As we 
will see, the word “coercion” is sufficiently plastic or ambiguous to 
encompass both concepts, coercion and compulsion (and perhaps other 
concepts as well). 
B. The “Anti-Coercion Principle” as an Anti-Compulsion Principle 
Given the ambiguity of the word “coercion,” the joint opinion starts, 
very helpfully, by expressly acknowledging that “coercion” requires 
definition.  “Once it is recognized that spending-power legislation cannot 
coerce state participation,” the opinion observes, “two questions remain: 
(1) What is the meaning of coercion in this context?  (2) Is the ACA’s 
expanded Medicaid coverage coercive?”44  Without missing a beat, it then 
announces that 
The answer to the first of these questions—the meaning of coercion in 
the present context—is straightforward.  As we have explained, the 
legitimacy of attaching conditions to federal grants to the States 
depends on the voluntariness of the States’ choice to accept or decline 
the offered package.  Therefore, if States really have no choice other 
than to accept the package, the offer is coercive, and the conditions 
cannot be sustained under the spending power.45 
In short, despite its reference to the “anti-coercion principle,” the 
standard the joint opinion actually deploys would be more accurately termed 
(in the language of this Article) an “anti-compulsion principle.”  Justice 
Ginsburg is not far off when observing that, “[f]or the joint dissenters, . . . all 
that matters, it appears, is whether States can resist the temptation of a given 
federal grant.”46 
Furthermore, the Chief Justice’s opinion, for himself and Justices 
Breyer and Kagan on this point, seems largely in accord.  “Permitting the 
Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal program 
 
44. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2661 (joint opinion). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 2640 n.24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
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would threaten the political accountability key to our federal system,” it 
reasons.47 
“[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may 
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while 
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”  Spending 
Clause programs do not pose this danger when a State has a legitimate 
choice whether to accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal 
funds. . . .  But when the State has no choice, the Federal Government 
can achieve its objectives without accountability . . . .48 
And in this case, the opinion concludes, the states really do lack a 
choice.  “The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget 
. . . is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to 
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”49  By striking down this condition, the 
opinion thus “limits the financial pressure the [federal government] may 
apply to induce States to accept the terms of the Medicaid expansion.”50  Just 
like the authors of the joint opinion, then, the Chief Justice understands the 
anti-coercion principle from conditional spending jurisprudence to police 
compulsion. 
II. Compulsion, Really? 
Suppose the states have “no choice” but to agree to provide coverage for 
the ACA’s new class of Medicaid beneficiaries because the cost to them of 
doing without Medicaid funds at all is so enormous, and therefore that the 
Medicaid expansion subjects them to compulsion.  Of course, the states do 
not literally have no choice in the matter.  But if compulsion exists only 
when an offeree has “no choice” but to accept, and if “no choice” in this 
context means, well, no choice, then compulsion would be a nearly useless 
concept.  Even seemingly paradigmatic instances of compulsion (including 
“your money or your life”) would turn out not to be compulsion at all.  And 
certainly the states could never be compelled by the threat of a withdrawal of 
federal funds, contrary to the assumption in Dole and Steward that this is a 
theoretical possibility.  The lesson is that “no choice” must be taken 
idiomatically, not literally, and be given a looser construction.  Thus, 
compulsion  exists when an offeree has no reasonable choice or no choice 
that it would be remotely rational for it to adopt, or something like this.51 
 
47. Id. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.). 
48. Id. at 2602–03 (internal citations omitted) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 169 (1992)). 
49. Id. at 2605. 
50. Id. at 2608. 
51. Recognizing that “no choice” cannot be taken literally, the joint opinion and Chief Justice 
Roberts sometimes qualify the phrase; “no real choice” is a favorite alternative.  See, e.g., id.  
Insofar as “real” contrasts with “fake,” it cannot be the most apt qualifier to have been selected.  But 
it does adequately signal that there are difficulties here that require attention. For analysis of 
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However the “no choice” standard is interpreted, it will be sufficiently 
vague as to license doubts that it meets the “judicial manageability” bar for 
judicially enforced constitutional doctrine.52  But put that worry aside.  So 
long as an anti-coercion principle remains part of judicial Spending Clause 
doctrine, and if it forbids compulsion, then whatever the difficulty of 
evaluating borderline cases, it is hard to contest the majority’s conclusion on 
the facts of this case.  The Medicaid expansion threatened states with the 
aggregate loss of $233 billion per year, equaling over 10% of all state 
budgetary outlays.53  The judgment that it would be so damaging for a state 
to sustain the loss of so many funds as to compel it to accept the new deal, if 
not quite inescapable,54 is more than reasonable.  If the majority holding is 
wrong, then, it is more likely because the majority was wrong to conclude 
that Congress is barred from making offers that the states are compelled to 
accept, without more.  The question is this: why should we understand the 
anti-coercion principle as one that disables Congress from using its spending 
power to craft offers so attractive that states are compelled to accept? 
In posing the question this way, I do not mean to gain any mileage from 
characterizing the proposal as an “offer” rather than as a “threat.”  I prefer to 
adopt the convention according to which, strictly speaking, every 
biconditional proposal consists of both a conditional offer and a conditional 
threat: the offer (threat) is the conditional proposal that contains the 
consequent that the proposal-maker anticipates the recipient will find the 
more (less) attractive of the two.  Thus, the merchant’s “two-for-one” offer is 
also a threat not to give you two if you don’t buy one; the robber’s threat to 
kill you if you don’t hand over your money is also an offer to let you live if 
you do.  Of course, it would ring false to describe the first proposal as a 
“threat” or the latter as an “offer.”  But I think the much-explored question of 
whether a particular proposal as a whole is better characterized as a threat or 
an offer distracts us from the normatively important questions.55  
 
different ways to cash out the “no choice” standard, and of difficulties that attend to each, see 
Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its 
Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 
517–21 (2003). 
52. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (“The 
coercion inquiry . . . appears to involve political judgments that defy judicial calculation.”). 
53. Id. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2664 (joint opinion).  Although the joint opinion describes 
this sum as “equaling 21.86% of all state expenditures combined,” that figure reflects the percentage 
of state spending that is comprised by state and federal Medicaid funds aggregated.  Brief of State 
Petitioners on Medicaid at 15, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-400). 
54. For an intriguing presentation of doubts, see Brian Galle, Does Federal Spending “Coerce” 
States?: Evidence from State Budgets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
55. For elaboration and defense of this position, see Berman, supra note 34, at 55–59.  See also 
E. Allan Farnsworth, Coercion in Contract Law, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 329, 333 (1982) 
(“Nothing is gained by attempting to distinguish offers from threats for the purposes of the law of 
duress.  Since a claim of duress can only succeed if the threat was one that the law condemns, the 
significant task is not to distinguish offers from threats but to distinguish those threats that the law 
condemns from those that it does not condemn.”).  The canonical effort to distinguish threats from 
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Accordingly, we can rephrase the question: why should we understand the 
anti-coercion principle to disable Congress from using its spending power to 
threaten states with consequences so unattractive that they are compelled to 
comply with the stated condition? 
A. “ . . . Much in the Nature of a Contract” 
In seeking an answer, we might start with the joint opinion.  Recall its 
assertion that 
The answer to the first of these questions—the meaning of coercion in 
the present context—is straightforward. . . .  [T]he legitimacy of 
attaching conditions to federal grants to the States depends on the 
voluntariness of the States’ choice to accept or decline the offered 
package.  Therefore, if States really have no choice other than to 
accept the package, the offer is coercive, and the conditions cannot be 
sustained under the spending power.56 
I observed that, in this short passage, the opinion contends that 
“coercion” means compulsion.  Indeed, it claims that this is straightforward 
or uncontroversially true.  What, we might now ask, makes this correct, let 
alone straightforwardly so? 
In large measure, the joint opinion’s answer is: the Court’s conditional 
spending precedent, Dole in particular.57  But Dole is a slender reed on which 
to rest.  We have already seen that Dole, like other spending cases, used the 
words “coercion” and “compulsion” so cavalierly as to instill significant 
doubt that the authors knew precisely what concepts they were after.58  
Moreover, the somewhat ambivalent manner in which Dole invoked the anti-
coercion principle (however that principle may be construed) provides 
further reason not to put all of one’s pineapples in this particular basket.  It 
would have been easy enough for the Dole majority to plainly announce five 
requirements that any condition attached to federal spending grants to the 
states must satisfy: it must promote the general welfare, be unambiguous, be 
germane to the federal interest in the spending program, not induce the states 
to violate the Constitution, and not coerce the states into accepting.  Instead, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion listed the first four restrictions in a single 
paragraph and then, only after determining that none condemned the 
condition on highway funds at issue in that case, introduced Steward 
Machine’s ruminations on coercion almost as an afterthought.59  Justice 
Ginsburg draws from this expositional curiosity the conclusion that Dole 
 
offers is Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 447–53 (Sidney 
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969). 
56. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 162 S. Ct. at 2661 (joint opinion). 
57. Id. at 2659, 2661 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987)). 
58. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
59. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–11. 
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only “mentioned, but did not adopt, [this] further limitation.”60  That might 
be too grudging.  But a weaker and more defensible lesson is that, if 
alternative interpretations of the anti-coercion principle are reasonably 
available, Dole alone provides less robust support for the interpretation 
adopted than one would hope for. 
Happily, and to its credit, the joint opinion does not rest its 
interpretation solely on passages from Spending Clause precedent that could 
conceivably be characterized as dicta.  Instead, it invokes contract law 
principles.  “When federal legislation gives the States a real choice whether 
to accept or decline a federal aid package,” it explains, “the federal-state 
relationship is in the nature of a contractual relationship. . . .  And just as a 
contract is voidable if coerced, the legitimacy of Congress’s power to 
legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily 
and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”61 
Parsed as an argument, the joint opinion’s reasoning on this score runs 
something like this: (1) Congress’s power to legislate under the spending 
power is informed by contract law principles; (2) contract law prohibits 
coercion; (3) therefore, rules governing exercises of the spending power 
properly prohibit coercion; (4) the meaning of coercion for purposes of 
contract law is compulsion; (5) therefore, the meaning of coercion in the 
spending context is compulsion. 
Premise (4), though unstated, is implicit.  After all, by observing that 
meaning must be expressly ascribed to “coercion” in the spending context, 
the joint opinion acknowledges that the term is ambiguous or at least not 
transparent.  It also says—or, at a minimum, strongly implies—that the limits 
on Congress’s spending power arise from principles of contract law, or from 
the same more fundamental considerations that undergird contract law: 
“[J]ust as a contract is voidable if coerced, the legitimacy of Congress’s 
power to legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether the State 
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”62  So 
premise (4) is necessary support for (5). 
But premise (4) is false.  Contract law does recognize a defense termed, 
interchangeably, “coercion” or “duress.”  As the Restatement of Contracts 
provides, “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper 
threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the 
contract is voidable.”63  What makes a threat “improper” is notoriously 
fuzzy.  A threat to commit a crime or tort would count, of course, but so too 
would a “breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing” under an existing 
contract, and, when it produces unfair terms, a threat to perform an act that 
 
60. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2634 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
61. Id. at 2659–60 (joint opinion) (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Roberts relies squarely on the contract law analogy too.  See id. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J.). 
62. Id. at 2660 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981).  
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“would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party 
making the threat.”64  The important point, though, is that the fact that one 
party had “no choice” but to accept a contract or a contractual condition is 
never sufficient alone to make the contract voidable.65  There must always 
be, in addition to the lack of “reasonable alternative[s],” an “improper 
threat.”66  In short, duress or coercion, in contract law, requires something 
very much like the conjunction of coercion and compulsion. 
The doctrine of unconscionability likewise will not support the idea that 
legal consequences should follow from the mere fact that one party to an 
agreement has “no choice” other than to accept.67  Comment 1 to § 2-302 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code offers an essentially circular definition: “The 
basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and 
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are 
so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the 
time of the making of the contract.”68  Farnsworth’s treatise states that  
[t]he most durable answer [for what unconscionability is] is probably 
that of the court in Williams v. Walker-Thomas: “Unconscionability 
has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one of the parties [a.k.a. procedural 
unconscionability] together with contract terms which are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party [a.k.a. substantive 
unconscionability].”69 
Most significantly for present purposes, “judges have been cautious in 
applying the doctrine of unconscionability, recognizing that the parties often 
must make their contract quickly, that their bargaining power will rarely be 
equal, and that courts are ill-equipped to deal with problems of unequal 
distribution of wealth.”70  In particular, “[c]ourts have resisted applying the 
doctrine [of unconscionability] where there is only procedural 
unconscionability without substantive unfairness.”71 
Both the joint opinion and Roberts’s opinion place great weight on the 
Court’s much-quoted observation in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman72 that “legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is 
much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree 
to comply with federally imposed conditions.”73  From this premise, the 
 
64. Id. § 176(1)(d), (2)(a). 
65. Id. at § 2-302 cmts. a–b. 
66. Id. 
67. I am grateful to John Golden for encouraging me to emphasize this point. 
68. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1996). 
69. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 301 (4th ed. 2004); cf. id. at 299 
(describing unconscionability as “incapable of precise definition”). 
70. Id. at 302. 
71. Id. 
72. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
73. Id. at 17. 
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Pennhurst Court concluded that “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’s power to 
legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily 
and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”74  Plucking the adverb 
“voluntarily” from its contract law context, the NFIB joint opinion concludes 
that an exercise of the spending power is unconstitutional if the offeree has 
“no choice” but to accept.75  Contract law principles do not support that 
expansive reading of what makes acceptance involuntary.  A contract is not 
voluntary for purposes of contract law if it is the product of duress or 
unconscionability.  And both doctrines require some form of impropriety by 
the offeror—an impropriety that is not made out just by the fact that the 
offeror crafted terms that it knew the offeree could not reasonably reject.76 
The bottom line is that “coercion” in contract law does not mean 
compulsion, and there is no principle of contract law that permits a contract 
to be voided just because one party had “no choice” but to accept.  This 
being so, the joint opinion is not entitled to its blithe assertion that the “anti-
coercion principle” is offended by an offer that effectively “compels” 
acceptance or, put otherwise, that “coercion” in Spending Clause 
jurisprudence means compulsion.  It might.  But analogizing a state’s 
agreement to comply with conditions on the receipt of federal funds to 
private agreements governed by contract law furnishes no support for this 
assertion.  To the contrary, if it is true, as the joint opinion suggests, that the 
limitations on Congress’s spending power derive from the same source as do 
the limits on “coerced” contracts, and if it is true, as the Restatement 
provides, that “coercion” in contract law requires coercion, then the 
conclusion to draw is radically opposed to that which the joint opinion 
asserts: “coercion” in Spending Clause jurisprudence requires coercion, and 
not compulsion (or not only compulsion).77 
Again, all that I have just written still falls short of conclusively 
establishing that a majority in NFIB was wrong to enforce an anti-
 
74. Id. 
75. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2661 (2012) (joint opinion). 
76. The Pennhurst Court might have appreciated all this.  For after briefly referencing 
voluntariness, the Court’s opinion says nothing more about it and proceeds to examine 
knowingness, ultimately dismissing a lawsuit against a state defendant on the grounds that the 
particular duties that plaintiffs alleged the state had assumed when accepting federal funds for the 
developmentally disabled had not been stated with sufficient clarity.  Despite repeated citations to 
Pennhurst both by Roberts and by the authors of the joint opinion, the holding of that case adds 
essentially nothing to the requirement, subsequently set forth in Dole, that conditions on spending 
be unambiguous. 
77. Remarkably, the contract law-inspired case for a compulsion-based interpretation of the 
spending doctrine’s “anti-coercion principle” is weaker still.  Even when coercion has been made 
out in contract law, the remedy is that the contract is voidable.  Here, the majority substantially 
weakens the notion of coercion—from, roughly, the conjunction of coercion and compulsion to 
(mere) compulsion—and also substantially strengthens the remedy.  If the joint opinion were 
serious about the contract analogy, the lesson would be that states could, without adverse 
consequence, back out of deals to which they had agreed under compulsion.  The majority goes 
beyond that to disable Congress even from making offers that subject the states to compulsion. 
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compulsion principle against Congress’s use of its spending power.  It could 
be that contract law furnishes a much less appropriate analogy for conditional 
offers of federal funds to the states than the majority assumes.  However 
close or distant the analogy, we should nonetheless pause to reflect on why 
contract law does not permit any legal consequences to follow from the mere 
fact that the offeree of a contract proposal had “no choice” but to accept.  It 
takes that approach because a contrary rule would be absurd.  People often 
accept deals because they have no good choice in the matter.  Consider law 
school graduate, L, in my hypothetical above.  It would be crazy to prevent 
the law firm from making an offer just because it would give L “no choice” 
but to accept.  Such a rule would make it nearly impossible to employ 
persons with radically limited options.  Not surprisingly, then, courts 
adjudicating contract disputes have rejected a bare anti-compulsion principle 
time and again.78 
B. Beyond Contract Law 
But perhaps the cases are distinguishable based on the source of the 
pressure.  In the law firm case, even if we rightly say that L had “no choice” 
other than to accept the firm’s offer and thus “was compelled” to accept it, 
we would not rightly say that the law firm compelled L to accept.  We would 
say, instead, that financial straits compelled L’s acceptance.  With respect to 
the Medicaid expansion, in contrast, defenders of the majority’s reasoning 
might say that the states were not compelled simply by circumstances to 
accept, but also that the statute, or Congress, compelled them to accept.  The 
pressure was exerted by Congress and not by other forces or circumstances. 
This is a tendentious description of the facts of the case.  It seems more 
accurate to say that the states, much like L, would have been compelled to 
accept by facts about the world.  Each state has many citizens and residents 
who are unable to provide for their own medical care; the state’s populace 
demands that it ensure that health care be made available for these needy 
folks; and the resulting financial obligations are too great for the state 
comfortably to handle.79  Sure, each state would have greater capacity to 
provide medical care for its needy if the national government did not tax its 
citizens to fund the national Medicaid program.  On the other hand, if 
Congress didn’t create Medicaid, the states might well find themselves back 
in a race to the bottom, the logic of which would also frustrate their ability to 
furnish substantial medical assistance to the poor and disabled.  So 
 
78. For a representative decision, but explained with Judge Posner’s characteristic lucidity, see 
Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 926–29 (7th Cir. 1983). 
79. See Diane Rowland & Adele Shartzer, America’s Uninsured: The Statistics and Back Story, 
36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 618, 619, 626 (2008) (outlining the growing number of uninsured and noting 
public opinion being generally in favor of covering those uninsured); KAISER COMM’N ON 
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 14 
fig.13 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-06.pdf (showing that states 
pay for 30% of uncompensated care for the uninsured totaling $17.2 billion). 
1302 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:1283 
 
Congress’s net contribution to the pressures that combine to give states “no 
realistic choice” other than to accept the deals proposed in the ACA is highly 
uncertain. 
Furthermore, even granting that Congress played some causal role in 
contributing to the circumstances that conspire to compel the states to agree 
to the new Medicaid conditions contained in the ACA, much more still needs 
to be said to justify the conclusion that Congress should be disabled from 
making the offer.  In other contexts, the fact that one party is causally 
responsible for pressure exerted upon another is still insufficient, absent 
coercion, to disable it from exerting pressure that effectively compels another 
party to accept its offers.80  Individuals and governments alike are often 
permitted to be agents of compulsion. 
Plea bargaining presents perhaps the best example.  Given a sufficiently 
large differential between the sentence that a defendant would face if 
convicted after trial and the sentence he is offered to plead guilty, along with 
a sufficiently high expected probability of conviction if he goes to trial, any 
given defendant could find it simply irrational to reject the deal.  That is, 
having no other reasonable or rational choice, he would be compelled to 
accept.  Many academic commentators have concluded, on this basis, that 
plea bargaining is unconstitutionally coercive.81  In our terminology, 
however, all that this establishes is that plea bargaining can constitute 
compulsion.  Yet the fact that the pressure that might compel a defendant to 
accept is exerted by the government, and not merely by the world at large, 
does not furnish a credible basis for challenging the plea offer.82 
Don’t misunderstand: plea bargaining should not be immune from 
constitutional scrutiny.  Sometimes, even often, it might constitute the wrong 
of coercion.83  My claim here is only that the fact, without more, that the 
threat of a stiff sanction might give a particular defendant no reasonable 
choice other than to accept is not a plausible basis for invalidating the offer 
of a much-reduced sanction in exchange for a guilty plea.  Courts have 
appropriately recognized as much.  As a unanimous Supreme Court 
explained over forty years ago: 
 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209–10 (1995) (asserting that the 
government is permitted to “exert[] pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series 
of fundamental rights” in the absence of “fraud or coercion”). 
81. See, e.g., Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s 
Guide to Loss, Abandonment, and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2016 (2000); John H. 
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargainingi 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12 (1978). 
82. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (rejecting a prisoner’s 
constitutional challenge to a plea bargain and stating that “by tolerating and encouraging the 
negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple 
reality that the prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his 
right to plead not guilty”). 
83. For that different argument, see Berman, supra note 19, at 98–103. 
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The State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty at every 
important step in the criminal process.  For some people, . . . 
apprehension and charge, both threatening acts by the Government, jar 
them into admitting their guilt.  In still other cases, the post-indictment 
accumulation of evidence may convince the defendant and his counsel 
that a trial is not worth the agony and expense to the defendant and his 
family.  All these pleas of guilty are valid in spite of the State’s 
responsibility for some of the factors motivating the pleas; the pleas 
are no more improperly compelled than is the decision by a defendant 
at the close of the State’s evidence at trial that he must take the stand 
or face certain conviction.84 
The jurisprudence of plea bargaining, then, supports and strengthens the 
lesson that contract law teaches: ordinarily, the fact that one party effectively 
compels another party to accept a deal by offering a benefit on terms that the 
latter could not reasonably reject is not adequate grounds for bringing 
adverse legal consequences to bear on the offeror—even when the offeror 
has played a part in making the threatened state of affairs as unattractive to 
the offeree as it is. 
But ordinarily is not invariably.  In at least one context other than 
conditional spending the Supreme Court has endorsed an anti-compulsion 
principle: the Establishment Clause.  If that principle is sound in that context, 
perhaps it is sound in the conditional federal spending context too. 
The key Establishment Clause case, of course, is Lee v. Weisman,85 a 5–
4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy.  Deeming it “beyond dispute that, at 
a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise,”86 the Court 
proceeded to hold unconstitutional officially led prayers at high school 
graduation ceremonies on the grounds that “the government may no more use 
social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.”87  
The objectionable social pressure, the Court explained, consisted of “public 
pressure, as well as peer pressure” exerted “on attending students to stand as 
a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and 
benediction.”88  Moving seamlessly between “coercion” and “compulsion,” 
the Court further emphasized that 
[t]his pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt 
compulsion. . . .  [F]or the dissenter of high school age, who has a 
reasonable perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a 
manner her conscience will not allow, the injury is no less real. . . .  It 
is of little comfort to a dissenter . . . to be told that for her the act of 
 
84. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (emphasis added). 
85. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
86. Id. at 587. 
87. Id. at 594. 
88. Id. at 593. 
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standing or remaining in silence signifies mere respect, rather than 
participation. What matters is that, given our social conventions, a 
reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group 
exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.89 
Finally, the majority dismissed impatiently the state’s contention that 
“attendance at graduation and promotional ceremonies is voluntary.”90  This 
argument, it announced, 
lacks all persuasion.  Law reaches past formalism.  And to say a 
teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school 
graduation is formalistic in the extreme. . . .  Attendance may not be 
required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not free 
to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real sense of the 
term “voluntary,” for absence would require forfeiture of those 
intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth 
and all her high school years.91 
In several respects Lee might appear to be a useful precedent for the 
NFIB majority on the spending issue.  First, under the label “coercion,” Lee 
deployed the concept of compulsion.  Second, the Court rejected a nominal 
or formalistic approach to the question of whether a right holder enjoyed a 
meaningful choice in favor of an inquiry into practical realities.  Third, 
having reasoned that a right holder’s nominal choice was not voluntary “in 
any real sense,” it concluded that the challenged practice amounted to 
unconstitutional “coercion” or “compulsion.”92 
Yet the authors of the joint opinion cannot easily avail themselves of the 
support that Lee might offer, for two of them—Justices Scalia and Thomas—
have denounced the Lee analysis in just the respects that matter here.  Indeed, 
the central thrust of Scalia’s opinion for the four Lee dissenters was precisely 
that the majority deployed an indefensible conception of coercion.93  
Although he agreed with “the Court’s general proposition that the 
Establishment Clause ‘guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in religion or its exercise,’” Scalia could “see no 
warrant for expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat 
of penalty . . . a brand of coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those 
of us who have made a career of reading the disciples of Blackstone rather 
than of Freud.”94  Importantly, Scalia’s objection was not that, while the 
majority properly understood “coercion” to exist when the government exerts 
too much pressure on a target, it erred in finding the line between tolerable 
 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 594. 
91. Id. at 594–95. 
92. Id. at 599. 
93. Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking a “boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test 
of psychological coercion . . .”). 
94. Id. at 642. 
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and excessive pressure crossed on the facts of the case.  Rather, as he 
emphasized some years later, his disagreement with the Lee majority 
concerned “the form that coercion must take.”95  And for Scalia, to repeat, 
the form that coercion must take is a threat to impose a legal penalty. 
Not only for Scalia is this the case.  As Justice Thomas reiterated a 
dozen years after Lee, in his Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow 
concurrence, “Lee adopted an expansive definition of ‘coercion’ that cannot 
be defended”96—“a notion of ‘coercion’ that . . . has no basis in law or 
reason.”97  The legally significant kind of coercion (at least for purposes of 
the Religion Clauses), Thomas insisted, was precisely the kind that Scalia 
had previously identified: “that accomplished ‘by force of law and threat of 
penalty.’”98  Naturally, precisely what this means turns on what Justices 
Scalia and Thomas mean by “penalty.”  We’ll explore that question in 
Part IV.  For the present, we can conclude merely that Lee’s compulsion-
prohibiting spin on the Establishment Clause’s own “anti-coercion principle” 
should not be welcome support for the authors of the NFIB joint opinion.99 
C. Blurring the Lines of Political Accountability 
The previous section showed that analogies to contract law, plea 
bargaining, and the law of religion do not support the proposition that 
conditional offers of federal funds—or, equivalently, conditional threats to 
withdraw or not to provide federal funds—are normatively problematic just 
because they give states no reasonable choice but to accept.100  In fact, those 
analogies do more to undermine the claim.  It remains, then, to consider 
whether there are good arguments for an anti-compulsion rule in the 
conditional spending context that are particular to that context and do not 
depend upon principles or considerations that sweep more broadly.  Perhaps 
even if an anti-compulsion rule makes little sense in most or all other legal 
domains, the relationship between the national government and the states is 
sui generis in respects that justify such a rule here. 
The majority does advance such an argument, one grounded in the 
theory, first floated in the anti-commandeering decision New York v. United 
 
95. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 908–09 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
96. 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
97. Id. at 49. 
98. Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
99. Well, not for all of them.  Justice Kennedy, one of the authors of the NFIB joint opinion, 
was also the author of Lee.  According to the Blackmun papers, though, and for whatever it may be 
worth, Kennedy was a late convert to the view he eventually penned.  Having been assigned after 
conference to write the majority opinion upholding the prayers, Kennedy concluded after several 
months that his “draft looked quite wrong,” causing him to switch his vote and thus produce a new 
5–4 majority going the other way.  Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/us/documents-reveal-the-
evolution-of-a-justice.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
100. For a discussion of these analogies, see supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text. 
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States,101 that national coercion of the states “blurs the lines of political 
accountability.”102  We already saw that Chief Justice Roberts relies on this 
consideration.103  So too does the joint opinion.  Quoting New York 
extensively, the joint opinion reasons that 
Where all Congress has done is to “encourag[e] state regulation rather 
than compe[l] it, state governments remain responsive to the local 
electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the 
people.  [But] where the Federal Government compels States to 
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is 
diminished.”. . .  When Congress compels the States to do its bidding, 
it blurs the lines of political accountability.  If the Federal Government 
makes a controversial decision while acting on its own, “it is the 
Federal Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, 
and it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the 
decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular.”  But when the 
Federal Government compels the States to take unpopular actions, “it 
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, 
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may 
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”  
For this reason, federal officeholders may view this “departur[e] from 
the federal structure to be in their personal interests . . . as a means of 
shifting responsibility for the eventual decision.”  And even state 
officials may favor such a “departure from the constitutional plan,” 
since uncertainty concerning responsibility may also permit them to 
escape accountability.  If a program is popular, state officials may 
claim credit; if it is unpopular, they may protest that they were merely 
responding to a federal directive.104 
This passage is hard to read with a straight face.  The Court was, after 
all, deliberating over the fate of a law universally known as “Obamacare.”105  
That inconvenient datum might be taken to cast doubt on the suggestion that 
the Constitution must be interpreted to proscribe federal spending programs 
that exert too much pressure on the states lest federal officials escape 
 
101. 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992). 
102. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2660 (2012) (joint opinion). 
103. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
104. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2660–61 (joint opinion) (internal citations 
omitted). 
105. The reasoning is also at least somewhat hard to take from avowed originalists.  For those 
scoring at home, the “blurred accountability” principle represents structural reasoning.  Insofar as 
the joint opinion’s embrace of the anti-compulsion principle rests on this rationale, it is not 
obviously justified by ordinary meaning originalism and therefore requires more elaboration than 
most originalists have provided regarding the relationship between structural principles or 
implications and a text’s public meaning.  For my critiques of originalism, see generally Mitchell N. 
Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009), and Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective 
Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons from John McCain and the Natural-Born 
Citizenship Clause, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 246 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
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accountability for an unpopular law.  But even if we abstract from the 
context of utterance, the claim should still strike us as resting upon a model 
of political accountability that is almost breathtakingly naïve. 
It’s not that I think there is nothing to this bit of political science 
wisdom.  There just isn’t enough to justify a flat rule that conditions on 
federal-spending grants to the states exceed Congress’s power if they leave 
states “no real choice” other than to accept.  The problem arises from the fact 
that the majority’s anti-compulsion rule marks off for special, disfavored 
treatment the polar case while permitting adjacent cases on the relevant 
continuum.  On the majority’s approach, Congress is fully entitled to attach 
conditions to its spending programs that exert so much pressure on the states 
as to make it, let us say, very hard for state officials to decline.  But as soon 
as the magnitude of pressure that a conditional offer exerts crosses the 
magical line that separates “pressure” from “compulsion,” “voluntary” from 
“involuntary,” and “really hard choice” from “no choice,” the offer is invalid. 
This is an implausible place to draw a constitutional line.  To be sure, 
courts must routinely craft doctrine that attaches dichotomous consequences 
to phenomena that lie on either side of a largely arbitrary dividing line.  The 
problem here is not, then, that the majority’s line is arbitrary.  The problem is 
that the line is perverse. 
On any remotely realistic picture of American political and electoral 
dynamics, a federal offer that gives states “no choice” but to accept threatens 
accountability less than does an offer that puts substantial pressure on the 
states while leaving them some choice in the matter.106  In the former case, it 
is much easier for a modestly informed voter to realize that the policy she 
dislikes was forced upon the states and therefore is the responsibility of 
federal agents.107  In the latter, it will require vastly more sophistication for 
the voter to develop an informed view regarding whether the pressure was 
such that, all things considered, the state agents should or should not have 
acquiesced. 
The authors of the joint opinion deem it “unmistakably clear. . . . that 
every State would have no real choice but to go along with the Medicaid 
Expansion.”108  They’re right: it is unmistakably clear.109  That’s why a 
perfectly sensible concern with blurred lines of political accountability 
cannot justify the rule they defend.  That concern would more sensibly 
permit congressional action at the extremes—either straightforward 
 
106. For a brief summary of other criticisms of the Supreme Court’s accountability theory, 
including citations to other authors, see Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A 
Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1632–33 (2006). 
107. Cf. id. at 1632 (suggesting that the accountability issues of commandeering are 
exaggerated because engaged citizens are able to track the level of government responsible for 
particular initiatives). 
108. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (joint opinion). 
109. But perhaps I should say that it seems unmistakably clear yet might not be.  See supra note 
54. 
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commands to the states or inducements so weak as to be accepted only by the 
wholehearted—and prohibit or constrain offers that alter the option sets 
faced by state offerees in ways too complicated and subtle for voters to 
intelligently assess.  Of course, I am not advocating that conditional spending 
offers that exert significant pressure short of compulsion should be 
prohibited.  My point is only that the consideration on which the majority 
Justices would rely does not carry them where they wish to go. 
III. Roberts, Once More 
If, as Part II argues, it makes little sense to interpret our Constitution to 
prohibit Congress from using offers of federal funds to compel states to 
accede to conditions that Congress could not mandate, that does not cast 
doubt on the “anti-coercion principle.”  That principle could be construed as 
one that prohibits Congress from using offers of federal funds to coerce 
states to accede to conditions that Congress could not mandate.  Little 
argument is necessary to establish that this is a sound principle.  It follows 
from what I have elsewhere termed “the threat principle”: ordinarily, if it is 
wrong to φ, it is wrong to threaten to φ.110  And few people are ever moved to 
contest that principle.111 
No, the objection to interpreting the Spending Clause as circumscribed 
by a true anti-coercion principle is not that Congress should be free to coerce 
the states into accepting behavioral conditions that Congress could not 
mandate.  The objection is that that constraint is essentially meaningless.  
Because the states are not constitutionally entitled to federal funds,112 the 
threat to withhold them is never a threat to act wrongfully, constitutionally 
speaking, therefore threats to withhold federal funding from states can never 
constitute any type of coercion that is constitutionally cognizable.  
Consequently, the objection continues, a constitutional limitation on 
 
110. See Mitchell N. Berman, Blackmail, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 37, 39 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011).  The “paradox of blackmail” is 
the criminal law counterpart to the puzzle of unconstitutional conditions: both ask how it can be 
wrongful within a particular normative system to threaten what would be permissible, within that 
system, to do (i.e., withhold a governmental benefit, disclose an embarrassing secret).  My solutions 
to the two puzzles are analogous.  In my view, Bill Edmundson is mistaken to assert that blackmail 
demonstrates that a proposal can be wrongfully coercive for reasons that do “not derive from or 
depend upon the wrongness of the declared unilateral plan [i.e., the conduct threatened].”  
Edmundson, supra note 37, at 457.  In both cases, the seemingly permissible conduct threatened 
may be impermissible when undertaken for certain reasons, and the fact of the conditional offer 
might have evidentiary bearing on whether those reasons are present. 
111. Nuclear deterrence is not a counterexample.  If, as most people believe, it is morally 
permissible, all things considered, to threaten nuclear retaliation against a nation that launches an 
offensive nuclear attack, that is not because the threat does not constitute the moral wrong of 
coercion.  It is because exceptional circumstances might justify engaging in the wrong of coercion, 
as is true of most moral wrongs, and because deterring nuclear attack provides adequate 
justification. 
112. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (“States have no entitlement to receive 
any Medicaid funds; they enjoy only the opportunity to accept funds on Congress’ terms.”). 
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Congress’s spending power that is fairly described in “anti-coercion” terms 
must proscribe more than coercion.113  I will argue in the next Part that this 
objection rests on a mistaken premise.  It can be constitutionally wrong to 
withhold funds to which a state is not constitutionally entitled, and therefore 
can be constitutionally wrong—the wrong of coercion—to conditionally 
threaten to withhold them. 
But this is getting ahead of ourselves.  Here I aim only to bolster doubts 
raised in the previous Part about the coherence or soundness of the anti-
compulsion principle as applied to federal spending programs by showing 
that the Chief Justice does not endorse that principle as unambiguously as a 
first read of his opinion suggests.  I have already said that the Roberts 
opinion appears to maintain, with the joint opinion, that the Medicaid 
expansion is unconstitutional because it gives states “no choice” but to 
accept.114  That is, the condition is impermissible, in Roberts’s estimation, 
precisely because it amounts to impermissible compulsion.  Yet several 
passages in Roberts’s opinion indicate ambivalence on his part regarding 
whether the fact that a conditional spending offer by the federal government 
would compel state acceptance is sufficient to render the proposal 
unconstitutional. 
A. The Modification Mystery 
The first puzzle arises from Roberts’s evident concern with whether the 
Medicaid expansion is a modification of the preexisting Medicaid program 
or, instead, a new program.  Rejecting Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion that 
“existing Medicaid and the expansion dictated by the Affordable Care Act 
are all one program simply because ‘Congress styled’ them as such,”115 the 
Chief Justice’s opinion concludes that the Medicaid expansion is in fact a 
new program, largely on the grounds that it “accomplishes a shift in kind, not 
merely degree.”116  The dissent strenuously disagrees.117  Put aside for the 
moment who’s right.  The mystery is simply that Roberts should care.  If, as 
Roberts appears to maintain, the dispositive constitutional question is 
whether the states had a “real choice” regarding whether to accept the 
 
113. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1456 
(1989) (“There is good reason to turn elsewhere in a search for the rationale of unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, both because the necessary baselines are elusive, once government benefits in 
this context are conceded to be gratuitous, and because government, which differs significantly 
from any given individual, can burden rights to autonomy through means other than coercion.  
Coercion thus begins rather than ends the inquiry.”). 
114. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
115. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (quoting id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting 
in part)). 
116. Id. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.). 
117. Id. at 2635–36, 2639–41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
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Medicaid expansion, it is not at all clear why the conclusion would differ 
depending on how that expansion is “properly viewed.”118 
Seemingly, the answer is this: When enacting the original Medicaid 
provisions, Congress had expressly reserved “[t]he right to alter, amend, or 
repeal any provision” of the statute.119  Therefore, if the Medicaid expansion 
effected by the ACA was properly deemed an “amendment” to the 
preexisting Medicaid program, then notice of its possibility is fairly 
attributed to the states.  But if the expansion were not an amendment, then 
the Court could conclude that it wasn’t foreseeable.  Attributing just this 
rationale to the Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg asserts—without 
contradiction—that his claim that “the expansion was unforeseeable by the 
States when they first signed on to Medicaid” constitutes one of “three 
premises, each of them essential to his theory.”120 
But this is no solution to the mystery at all.  Congress cannot, simply by 
reserving the right to amend a program, manufacture the authority to create 
amendments that exceed its constitutional authority.  As the states rightly 
objected, the federal government’s heavy reliance on its reservation of rights 
“confuses foreseeability and coercion.”121  The relevant question “is not 
whether States had any warning that Congress might exploit their 
dependence on Medicaid funding to coerce compliance with a massive 
expansion of the program, but whether Congress’s coercive action is 
permissible.”122  If it is not permissible because it compels acceptance by 
giving states no choice other than to acquiesce, then the fact that the states 
can be held to have seen it coming is of no moment, for what they should 
also have seen coming is a judicial invalidation of the effort. 
We can view the same point through a slightly different lens—through 
Roberts’s intimation that it would have been permissible for Congress to 
accomplish exactly what it attempted through the Medicaid expansion had it 
first repealed the preexisting Medicaid program in its entirety and then 
enacted a new law that consisted of the prior law plus the Medicaid 
expansion.  Justice Ginsburg takes the permissibility of this gambit for 
granted, framing the question that the Medicaid expansion presents around 
just that assumption: “To cover a notably larger population, must Congress 
take the repeal/reenact route, or may it achieve the same result by amending 
existing law?”123  Again, Roberts does not deny this is so.  To the contrary, 
his brief footnote response—that, due to practical or political considerations, 
 
118. Id. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.). 
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1304. 
120. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
121. Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 41, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. 2566 
(No. 11-400). 
122. Id. at 42. 
123. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
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repeal and reenactment “would certainly not be that easy”124—strongly 
implies his agreement that it would be constitutional in the unlikely event it 
were to occur.  Again, though, it is mysterious why this should be if the 
constitutionally relevant inquiry is whether states have a realistic option to 
reject Congress’s proposed deal. 
B. The Reasons Riddle 
For a second puzzle, consider Roberts’s curious response to the states’ 
“claim that this threat serves no purpose other than to force unwilling States 
to sign up for the dramatic expansion of health care coverage effected by the 
Act.”125  “Given the nature of the threat and the programs at issue here,” he 
observed, 
we must agree.  We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the 
receipt of funds on the States’ complying with restrictions on the use 
of those funds, because that is the means by which Congress ensures 
that the funds are spent according to its view of the “general Welfare.”  
Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds, however, 
cannot be justified on that basis.  When, for example, such conditions 
take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent 
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the 
States to accept policy changes.126 
The response appears to maintain that Congress’s purposes or reasons 
for action are constitutionally relevant and that, in enacting the Medicaid 
expansion, Congress was motivated by bad ones.127  Yet if, as the anti-
compulsion rendering of the anti-coercion principle appears to have it, a 
conditional offer exceeds Congress’s power just because it leaves the states 
with “no choice” but to accept, it is something of a riddle why Congress’s 
purposes should matter.  If compulsion is the constitutional wrong, and if the 
ACA’s threat to withhold all Medicaid funding unless the recipient state 
agrees to cover a new class of beneficiaries does in fact “force unwilling 
States to [accede to that condition],” it should be neither here nor there that 
the threat “serves no purpose other than” to secure compliance. 
And why does it matter whether “the conditions are properly viewed as 
a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes”?  We know from 
Steward Machine, by way of Dole, that pressure by itself does not constitute 
compulsion.128  So one might have thought, consistent with the body of 
Roberts’s opinion, that how the conditions “are properly viewed” is again 
 
124. Id. at 2606 n.14 (Roberts, C.J.). 
125. Id. at 2603. 
126. Id. at 2603–04. 
127. See id. at 2606–07 (Roberts, C.J.) (“Congress may not simply conscript state agencies into 
the national bureaucratic army, . . . and that is what it is attempting to do with the Medicaid 
expansion.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
128. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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irrelevant.  If the conditions are properly viewed “as a means of pressuring 
the States,” but the pressure exerted leaves the states with some choice in the 
matter, then the condition does not produce compulsion and is constitutional.  
Contrariwise, if the pressure exerted leaves the states with “no choice” in the 
matter, then we would have compulsion, hence unconstitutionality, even if 
the conditions are “properly viewed” in some other light. 
In short, this passage appears to consider it relevant to the constitutional 
inquiry—perhaps, indeed, fully inculpatory—that Congress’s “purpose” 
behind this particular threat to withhold a benefit was to “pressure” reluctant 
states into behaving in a manner that Congress could not mandate.  But it is 
not clear why, on an unadorned anti-compulsion construal of the governing 
constitutional principle, Congress’s reasons for acting should be relevant. 
C. The Penalty Puzzle 
A final puzzle attaches to Roberts’s tantalizing but underdeveloped 
suggestion that withholding a benefit to which a state is not constitutionally 
entitled is unconstitutional if non-provision of the benefit would penalize the 
exercise of a state’s constitutional prerogatives.  “Nothing in our opinion,” 
concludes the Chief Justice near the end of his spending power analysis, 
precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care 
Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States 
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use.  What 
Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to 
participate in that new program by taking away their existing 
Medicaid funding.129 
This short passage provokes at least two questions.  First, what does it 
mean to “penalize” a state (or to impermissibly “penalize” a state)?  
Presumably “to penalize” is equivalent to “to impose a penalty.”  So we 
could rephrase the question: What is a “penalty”?  Second, what is the 
relationship between penalties and compulsion? 
We should not have to travel far for an answer to the first query.  As 
luck would have it, resolution of the taxing power question turned precisely 
on the Court’s answer to the question of whether the provision that required 
citizens who fail to secure minimum health insurance coverage to pay a sum 
to the IRS levied a “tax” or imposed a “penalty.”130  Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, in dissent on this point, concluded the latter.131  
Chief Justice Roberts, in a portion of his opinion joined by the remaining 
justices, concluded the former.132  Whether one concludes that the putative 
tax was or was not a “penalty,” surely one must first know what it is for an 
 
129. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2607 (Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis added). 
130. Id. at 2594–600. 
131. Id. at 2652–55 (joint opinion). 
132. Id. at 2600 (Roberts, C.J.). 
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exaction to be a penalty.  And Roberts is quick to endorse the definition 
offered by past cases: “[I]f the concept of penalty means anything, it means 
punishment for an unlawful act or omission.”133  In full accord on the 
definitional point, the joint opinion declares that “[o]ur cases establish a clear 
line between a tax and a penalty: A tax is an enforced contribution to provide 
for the support of government; a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed by 
statute as punishment for an unlawful act.”134 
Unfortunately, whatever the merit to this conceptualization of penalty in 
the tax context, it cannot be what Roberts has in mind when charging that the 
Medicaid expansion impermissibly threatens to penalize non-acquiescing 
states.  The state challengers to the provision argue, and a Supreme Court 
majority agrees, that conditions on the new Medicaid funds transgress the 
“anti-coercion principle” because non-participation in the new program is not 
a realistic option.135  But nobody argues, and it is not plausible, that the 
Medicaid expansion makes non-participation in the new program “unlawful.”  
So if, through the Medicaid expansion, Congress is threatening “to penalize 
states that choose not to participate in that new program,” it must be the case 
that the withdrawal of benefits to which a state is not constitutionally entitled 
can constitute a penalty even when the withdrawal is predicated on 
something other than “an unlawful act or omission” by the state.  The 
problem is that Roberts offers the reader no clue, outside this brief and 
enigmatic passage, regarding what concept of penalty he means to employ. 
Actually, the problem runs deeper if we are to insist that whatever 
conception of penalty Roberts might have dimly in mind must fit with the 
anti-compulsion reading of his opinion.  To see why such fit is doubtful, 
imagine (contrary to fact, I am willing to assume) that a state’s existing 
Medicaid funding, though substantial, were not so great that the state could 
not reasonably choose to forgo it as the price for not accepting the Medicaid 
expansion.  Imagine too that a state were to exercise its practical option to 
say no and that, as a result, Congress were to take away all its Medicaid 
funding.  How should we analyze the case? 
Three possible characterizations of Congress’s action seem most 
eligible: (1) withdrawal of funding under these circumstances does not 
“penalize” the affected state, and is permissible; (2) withdrawal of funding 
under these circumstances does “penalize” the affected state, and is 
impermissible; and (3) withdrawal of funding under these circumstances does 
“penalize” the affected state, but is nonetheless permissible.  (The fourth 
logical possibility—that withdrawal of funding does not “penalize” the state, 
and is impermissible—is a nonstarter.)  None of these possibilities sits well 
with an unadorned “anti-compulsion” reading of the Chief Justice’s opinion. 
 
133. Id. at 2596 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF & 
I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996)). 
134. Id. at 2651 (joint opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
135. Id. at 2662–64 (joint opinion). 
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Possibility (1) is not attractive, for it makes the presence of compulsion 
constitutive of whether an exaction is a penalty, yet it is commonplace that 
there are some exactions properly denominated penalties that one could 
rationally choose to incur.  Possibility (3) is also not attractive because it 
seems to make penalty analysis do no work at all.  On reading (3), Roberts 
should not have said (as he did) that Congress is not free to penalize states 
that choose not to participate in the new program; he should have said only 
that Congress is not free to compel states into participating.  That leaves 
possibility (2).  How plausible this proposition is must await further analysis 
of the concept of penalty.  But if it does prove plausible, it creates tension 
with the view that, for Roberts, it is decisive that rejecting the Medicaid 
expansion was not a real or realistic option for the states.  On possibility (2), 
Roberts would be saying not only (or not even) that Congress may not 
compel states to accept the Medicaid expansion, but also (or rather) that 
Congress may not threaten to penalize states that don’t. 
* * * 
To summarize, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, written for himself and 
for Justices Breyer and Kagan, provokes at least three questions.  First, what 
is the relevance of the fact, if true, that the Medicaid offer was not a 
modification of the preexisting Medicaid program?  Second, what is the 
constitutional significance of Congress’s reasons for structuring the Medicaid 
expansion as it did?  Third, what is a “penalty” for Spending Clause purposes 
(or more generally), and how does the concept of penalty interact with those 
of compulsion and coercion? 
The presence of these puzzles demonstrates that Roberts, Breyer, and 
Kagan might well have harbored doubts—doubts wholly consistent with the 
equivocal language used in Spending Clause precedents—about the 
“straightforward” anti-compulsion reading of the “anti-coercion principle” 
favored by the joint opinion.  But they do more than that.  As we will see, 
these puzzling aspects of the opinion lend support to (I do not say they 
“compel”) the interpretations of coercion and penalty that I offer in the next 
Part.136 
 
136. In a careful and thorough analysis of the NFIB Spending Clause holding, Sam Bagenstos 
maintains that my analysis of conditional spending confronts “two significant problems.”  
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript of August 2012 at 34).  The second is that it has overly 
broad implications.  I address this worry as the fifth objection in Part V, infra.  The first problem is 
that my analysis “would not be an attractive interpretation of the Roberts opinion,” in part because 
whereas I end up concluding that Dole was wrongly decided, the Chief Justice accepts it 
unquestioningly.  Id. at 38. 
  Given this criticism, I should make very clear that I do not claim that my analysis is an 
interpretation of the Roberts opinion.  While I do claim that features of his opinion cohere well with 
my analysis, I fully agree with Bagenstos that my analysis is inconsistent with some things that the 
Chief Justice says.  Endeavoring to make better sense of that opinion than my analysis does, 
Bagenstos advocates (somewhat half-heartedly) what he calls “the anti-leveraging principle,” which 
provides that “[w]hen Congress takes an entrenched federal program that provides very large sums 
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IV. The Medicaid Expansion and the Anti-Coercion Principle, Rightly 
Understood 
Readers sympathetic to the Medicaid expansion are likely to find the 
arguments to this point, if persuasive, heartening.  If what I have argued so 
far is correct, the Medicaid provisions of the ACA should be held 
unconstitutional only if the consequence that the biconditional proposal 
threatens to impose on a non-accepting state—withdrawal of all Medicaid 
funding—would be unconstitutional.  And common wisdom holds that this 
cannot be.  As the amicus brief for former Surgeon General David Satcher 
and others maintains, “[f]or the financial inducement offered by Congress to 
become unconstitutionally coercive, that inducement must, at a minimum, 
deprive the state of something to which the state is otherwise entitled.”137  
And, the argument continues, no state is entitled to federal Medicaid funds.138  
I argue in this Part that the major premise is mistaken. 
My argument proceeds in three steps.  Subpart IV(A) formulates and 
provisionally defends a general principle concerning one likely entailment or 
corollary of constitutional rights.  I call this the “anti-penalty principle” 
mostly because it is apt, but also because that designation makes for a 
pleasing companion to the anti-coercion principle we have already been 
discussing.  The next two steps assess the Medicaid expansion in light of this 
general principle.  Subpart IV(B) introduces a highly stylized or schematic 
understanding of the Medicaid expansion as consisting of three discrete 
conditional offers: an offer of funds for the blind, the disabled, the elderly, 
and poor families with dependent children; an offer of funds for adult 
childless poor; and an offer to render states eligible for the first offer only if 
they accept the second.  It concludes that, if this is how the Medicaid 
expansion is fairly or properly viewed, it runs afoul of the anti-penalty 
principle and, as a consequence, of the anti-coercion principle too.  Subpart 
IV(C) considers whether the conclusion from subpart IV(B) changes when 
we recharacterize the Medicaid expansion as a single program or package.  
 
to the states and tells states that they can continue to participate in that program only if they also 
agree to participate in a separate and independent program, the condition is unconstitutionally 
coercive.”  Id. at 5.  The warrant for this principle is that only it makes sense of all aspects of Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion.  A central difference between my approach and Bagenstos’s, accordingly, 
concerns just how seriously each of us takes all aspects of that opinion.  As I read Bagenstos, he 
appears to assume that Roberts’s opinion is fully coherent and well thought out.  I, in contrast, read 
the opinion as gestural and at least partly inchoate.  Divining normatively defensible parameters for 
the exercise of Congress’s spending power is a real challenge.  In light of both the difficulty of the 
problem and the somewhat meandering tenor of Roberts’s opinion, I find it more plausible and 
profitable than does Bagenstos to understand that opinion to be grasping toward a solution rather 
than to have captured one. 
137. Brief for David Satcher et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Florida v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 588459, at 
*2 (emphasis added). 
138. Id. 
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Although I acknowledge that this is a difficult question, I conclude that, on 
the facts of this case, it probably does not. 
A. The Anti-Penalty Principle 
1. Introduction to Unconstitutional Conditions.—We saw in Part III 
that there exists what the Justices described as a well-established definition 
of “penalty”: a penalty is an exaction imposed as punishment for unlawful 
conduct.139  That well-settled definition, however, is localized.  It is the 
definition accepted in the tax context for distinguishing exactions that are and 
are not permissible exercises of Congress’s taxing power: the exaction is 
permissible if a “tax,” impermissible if a “penalty.”140  It does not apply 
across the legal board.  In particular, courts have frequently used or gestured 
to a very different conception of penalty in “unconstitutional conditions” 
cases.141 
Although courts and commentators often refer to the “unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine,” if a doctrine is a set of rules or tests, then there is no 
such doctrine—at least none with more than trivial content.142  Better to think 
and speak of a “conditional offer problem” or a “conditional offer puzzle”—
the difficulty of properly analyzing governmental offers of benefits that it is 
not constitutionally obligated to provide conditioned on the offeree’s waiver 
or non-exercise of a constitutional right.  Federal offers of funds to states on 
the condition that they exercise their sovereign prerogatives in any fashion 
that Congress could not mandate raise the conditional offer problem.  So too 
do countless offers of benefits conditioned on the waiver of individual rights: 
welfare grants for the poor conditioned on their agreement to be subjected to 
warrantless, suspicionless searches,143 subsidies for public broadcasters 
conditioned on their agreement not to editorialize,144 lower criminal 
sentences conditioned on a defendant’s waiver of his right to put the state to 
 
139. See supra subpart III(C). 
140. Nat’l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651 (2012) (joint opinion). 
141. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 340 (1971) (stating that the right to welfare 
benefits conditioned on warrantless searches amounts to a civil penalty). 
142. You could read a dozen scholarly discussions of “the unconstitutional conditions doctrine” 
before running into a clear statement of what the doctrine is supposed to say or what its content is.  
When a statement of the doctrine’s content is provided, it often goes something like this: 
“Essentially, this doctrine declares that whatever an express constitutional provision forbids 
government to do directly it equally forbids government to do indirectly.”  William W. Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
1439, 1445–46 (1968).  Courts have, on occasion, said such things.  But I’d be surprised if anybody 
in a generation has believed that broad claim to be true, which suggests that it could be an accurate 
rendition of the doctrine only if everybody believed that the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine” 
is false.  Not everybody does, so it must have different content. 
143. E.g., Wyman, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
144. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
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its burden of proof,145 land use variances conditioned on a landowner’s grant 
to the public of some of its property rights,146 and on and on.  Since the 
earliest cases that first self-consciously identified the conditional offer 
problem, way back in the 1870s,147 courts have failed so spectacularly to 
analyze the problem in a coherent or even consistent fashion as “to make a 
legal realist of almost any reader,” as Seth Kreimer aptly put it.148  The only 
rendering of the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine” that is remotely 
faithful to the cases would maintain that sometimes conditional offers of the 
foregoing sort are permissible, while sometimes they aren’t.149 
Be that as it may, courts have, predictably, experimented with a variety 
of analytic approaches.  And one of the more common turns on the concept 
of a penalty.  The idea, very simply (perhaps a little too simply, as we will 
see), is that it is unconstitutional to penalize the exercise of a constitutional 
right.150  Call this succinct claim “the anti-penalty principle” (AP).  It is 
defeasible.  Put in familiar terms, penalizing a constitutional right infringes 
but does not violate the right.  Thus: 
AP: It is presumptively unconstitutional for the government to 
penalize the exercise of a constitutional right. 
Furthermore, by dint of the straightforward idea that it is impermissible 
to threaten what it is impermissible to do (the heart of a true anti-coercion 
principle), it is also presumptively unconstitutional to threaten to penalize the 
exercise of a constitutional right. 
Judicial statements that endorse AP or something very close to it are 
common.  We have already seen, for example, that Justices Scalia and 
Thomas approved it in Lee v. Weisman151 and that the Chief Justice at least 
flirts with it in NFIB.152  We also observed that, for this proposition to be 
useful, we will need to know what “penalty” and “penalize” mean—
something that the frequent judicial endorsements of AP rarely divulge.  One 
might reasonably complain, therefore, that AP is not, by itself, terribly 
informative.  But even if not as informative or fully specified as we’d like, I 
anticipate that most readers, likely operating with just an inchoate sense of 
what a penalty is, will find it rather intuitive.  Quickly: May the state 
 
145. E.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
146. E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987). 
147. The earliest cases involved state laws that conditioned the grant of corporate privileges on 
an out-of-state corporation’s agreement not to remove suits filed against it to federal court.  For a 
discussion, see Berman, supra note 19, at 59–70. 
148. Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984). 
149. Id. 
150. For discussion and analysis of this principle in the case law, see Sullivan, supra note 113, 
at 1433–43. 
151. See supra subpart II(B). 
152. See supra subpart III(C). 
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withdraw eligibility for free school lunches from the children of mothers who 
obtain abortions?  Surely not.  And why not?  Because doing so 
impermissibly penalizes a woman’s exercise of her constitutional right to an 
abortion.153 
I think we are therefore entitled to embrace AP as a working 
hypothesis—a hypothesis, I emphasize, not a conclusion.154  The goal for this 
section, accordingly, is to develop conceptions of “penalty” and “penalize” 
pursuant to which AP is in fact true.  Moreover, because AP is so frequently 
invoked in an effort to explain why some conditional offers of “benefits” 
(i.e., largesse, advantages, or things of value to which the beneficiary is not 
constitutionally entitled) are unconstitutionally coercive, we hope further for 
a definition of penalty that will capture at least some withdrawals or denials 
of benefits.  In short, the desiderata for a definition of penalty are (1) that it 
render AP true and (2) that it encompass at least some failures or refusals to 
furnish benefits (as just defined). 
2. The Baseline Problem.—Here’s a first stab, courtesy of the Court’s 
Self-Incrimination Clause jurisprudence tracing back to its 1965 decision in 
Griffin v. California.155  The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court has consistently held, permits defendants not only to 
remain silent, free from criminal punishment, but also “to suffer no penalty 
 
153. An alternative explanation would be that the state is impermissibly trying to discourage 
women from exercising their right to an abortion.  But this is a bad explanation.  It is true that the 
state is prohibited from trying to influence exercises of some rights.  For example, it may not act for 
the purpose of encouraging or discouraging attendance at houses of religious worship.  But this is 
not true of all rights, and, as a matter of positive law, the state is permitted to try to encourage 
women to “choose life.”  You might think that is a mistaken decision.  Maybe it is, maybe it isn’t.  
The critical point is that the hypothetical action described in the text should strike us as plainly 
unconstitutional even assuming arguendo that the state is constitutionally permitted to try to 
discourage women from exercising their right to an abortion.  That is, the state may not try to 
discourage women from having abortions by the particular means of threatening to penalize them if 
they do. 
154. At least one eminent commentator has denied this.  Cass Sunstein once went so far as to 
conclude that “[t]he Constitution offers no general protection against the imposition of penalties on 
the exercise of rights.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an 
Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 
603 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Anachronism].  That is, he flatly denied AP.  He could maintain 
this position, however, only because he already accepted a definition of penalty (a non-normative 
one, to jump ahead) according to which AP is false.  The other possibility is to accept AP and then 
try to formulate a conception of penalty that vindicates it.  I think the second approach far preferable 
because most of us start with a strong (though necessarily defeasible) pretheoretical commitment to 
AP. 
  Revealingly, when he later converted his 1990 article into a book chapter, Sunstein softened 
his rejection of an anti-penalty principle.  The claim then became that “[i]t is not clear that there is 
any general protection, in the Constitution, against penalties on rights.”  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 300 (1993) (emphasis added).  That is a very different claim, for indeed it 
is not “clear” that AP is true.  It is only “likely” or “intuitively plausible.”  The task is to see 
whether “penalty” can be specified in a manner that vindicates AP.  As it turns out, the specification 
that I will propose is different from that which Sunstein assumes.  See infra note 177. 
155. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
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. . . for such silence.”156  And “penalty,” the Court has emphasized, “is not 
restricted to fine or imprisonment.  It means . . . the imposition of any 
sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
‘costly.’”157  Given its embrace of the anti-penalty principle, and consistent 
with its understanding of “penalty” as governmental conduct that makes 
exercise of the right more costly, the Court has prohibited, for example, the 
prosecution from commenting on the accused’s silence,158 the court from 
instructing jurors that silence is evidence of guilt,159 and the organized bar 
from sanctioning non-testifying attorneys.160 
Griffin provides a starting point, but its use of the adjective “costly” 
cannot stand without qualification.  The Constitution does not plausibly 
forbid actions that make exercise of Fifth Amendment rights costly in some 
abstract or objective sense.  The underlying notion must be comparative.  Let 
us then read Griffin’s definition of penalty to cover actions that make 
individual conduct “more costly.”  For this definition to be useful, we need as 
well an answer to the question “more costly than what?”  The “what” is 
standardly termed the “baseline.”  Thus do we have the following proposed 
definition of penalty and penalize: 
P:  Any governmental act or omission, G, penalizes (i.e., 
imposes a penalty upon) some conduct, C, by an actor, A, if 
G makes C more costly for A than C would have been for A 
[had the appropriate baseline state of affairs obtained]. 
So far, so good.  But not far enough.  Plainly, we need to replace the 
bracketed language with a specification of the appropriate baseline. 
Although, in principle, any number of conceivable baselines might be 
identified, most or all will fall into one of two classes: either normative or 
non-normative.161  A normative baseline is constituted by the treatment that 
the agent, A, should get.162  Non-normative baselines fall into at least two 
subclasses: positive and counterfactual.163  A positive baseline is constituted 
by some actual state of affairs, such as the state of affairs that A in fact 
enjoyed prior to the governmental act or omission in question (a historical 
 
156. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
157. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 514. 
161. To simplify the discussion, I will put aside possible combinations of normative and non-
normative baselines.  This is a legitimate simplification because my goal in this section is to present 
sympathetically the objections that scholars have raised against efforts to solve the conditional offer 
problem by invoking the anti-penalty principle.  Complicating the menu of possible baselines is a 
move for proponents, not opponents, of AP. 
162. Kreimer, supra note 148, at 1373–74. 
163. See id. at 1359, 1363, 1371 (identifying three types of baseline: equality, history, and 
prediction, the latter of which correspond to the non-normative positive and counterfactual 
baselines); see also Berman, supra note 19, at 13 (identifying Kreimer’s equality, history, and 
prediction baselines as “positive (‘history’ and ‘prediction’) and normative (‘equality’)”). 
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baseline) or the state of affairs that agents similarly situated to A enjoy in the 
jurisdiction or elsewhere (a comparative baseline).164  A counterfactual 
baseline is constituted by what the world would look like under some 
specified counterfactual circumstance, such as the state of affairs that A 
would enjoy if the government were disabled from conditioning a benefit in 
the particular way that it has, and thus would have to provide it either more 
broadly or less broadly.165 
With this thumbnail taxonomy of possible baselines in hand, we reach 
the difficulty that confronts proponents of a penalty-based solution to the 
conditional offer puzzle: “the baseline problem.”166  The supposed problem is 
that no non-normative baseline provides a specification of P pursuant to 
which AP is true, and no normative baseline provides a specification of P 
pursuant to which it encompasses any non-provision of “benefits.”  Thus, the 
baseline cannot be specified in any fashion that provides a definition of 
penalty that satisfies both of our stated desiderata: (1) that it renders AP true 
and (2) that it shows that at least some failures to provide benefits 
impermissibly penalize rights. 
Let us take these two claims in order.  Take the most obvious candidate 
for a non-normative baseline: the “historical” baseline.  Fleshing out P by 
allowing history to constitute “the appropriate baseline” yields the following 
definition, that we can denominate P1: 
P1: Any governmental act or omission, G, penalizes some 
conduct, C, by an actor, A, if G makes C more costly for A 
than C would have been for A prior to G. 
P1 is a conceivable stipulative definition of “penalty.”  However, it is 
not a definition that makes AP true.  An increase in postage rates makes 
many exercises of First Amendment rights more costly than they would be 
absent the increase.  The decision to locate a polling place here rather than 
there makes it more costly for some people to exercise their right to vote.  
These and countless other governmental actions make exercise of rights more 
costly than they would be absent those actions, yet do not plausibly raise 
constitutional alarms.  Again: We are not looking for just any definition of 
“penalty” that minimally comports with linguistic usage; we are hunting for a 
definition of “penalty” that makes AP true. 
 
164. See Kreimer, supra note 148, at 1359–64 (examining “history as a baseline” and “equality 
as a baseline”). 
165. The seminal exploration of the types of baselines that might help solve the conditional 
offer problem is Kreimer, supra note 148.  See also, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats, and 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 289 (1989). 
166. Sometimes the “baseline problem” is raised as a challenge for accounts of constitutional 
“penalties.”  More often, it arises in the context of assessing whether conditional offers of benefits 
can ever be wrongfully “coercive.”  Because the most common way in which a threat to withhold a 
“benefit” can constitute coercion will be that it penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right, these 
two formulations of the baseline problem are fundamentally the same. 
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If P1 does not fit the bill, here’s a specification of P that does make AP 
true: 
P2: Any governmental act or omission, G, penalizes some 
conduct, C, by an actor, A, if G makes C more costly for A 
than C would have been for A had A received that to which 
A is constitutionally entitled. 
This is a somewhat complicated way to say that government penalizes 
conduct by treating the actor who engages in the conduct less well than the 
actor should be treated, constitutionally speaking.  It is therefore the most 
natural reflection of a normative baseline.  Unlike P1, P2 makes AP true—
indeed, P2 makes AP tautological.  But it makes AP true in a way such that 
AP cannot be violated by the withdrawal or nondisbursement of benefits, 
precisely because benefits are defined as goodies to which the beneficiary is 
not constitutionally entitled.  P2 does not satisfy our second desideratum. 
On the basis of reasoning like this, some of the leading constitutional 
theorists of our day have concluded that the withdrawal of benefits can never 
penalize rights in any sense of “penalizing rights” that is constitutionally 
suspect, which is also to say that threats to withdraw benefits (on failure of 
stated conditions) can never be unconstitutionally coercive.  As Kathleen 
Sullivan concluded in an influential article, “To hold that conditions coerce 
recipients because they make them worse off with respect to a benefit than 
they ought to be runs against the ground rules of the negative Constitution on 
which the unconstitutional conditions problem rests.”167 
3. The Baseline Solution.—I believe that this scholarly near-consensus 
is mistaken.  Its error is to suppose that the set of eligible normative baselines 
is exhausted by states of affairs describable without reference to 
government’s reasons for causing them, or allowing them to obtain.  The 
“penalty skeptics” (or “coercion skeptics”) maintain that if an actor is not 
constitutionally entitled to be provided with a benefit, then it cannot be 
improper for the state to withhold it.168  What they do not adequately 
appreciate is that government’s reasons for actions might be constitutionally 
 
167. Sullivan, supra note 113, at 1450; see also, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. 
TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 79 (1996) (“Where 
the government has no obligation to provide the subsidy at all, it makes no one legally worse off by 
conditioning the subsidy on desired behavior.  Under this test, however, the conditional-offer 
doctrine does no work.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 
58 DUKE L.J. 345, 373 (2008).  See generally Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitutional 
Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989). 
168. A common formulation is that benefits can be withheld “for any reason or no reason at 
all.”  For a charming illustration that people often say such a thing without reflection, see Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383–84 (1987): “Even though McPherson was merely a probationary 
employee, and even if she could have been discharged for any reason or for no reason at all, she 
may nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising her constitutional 
right to freedom of expression.”  Obviously, McPherson’s possible entitlement to reinstatement 
contradicts the supposition that she was dischargeable “for any reason.” 
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relevant, such that the non-provision of a benefit to which a would-be 
beneficiary is not constitutionally entitled can be unconstitutional because of 
the reasons for which it is not provided.169  Put in a familiar vocabulary, the 
skeptics focus exclusively on the outputs of state action, wholly neglecting 
the inputs. 
If government’s reasons for action (including inaction) are 
constitutionally relevant, then we should entertain the possibility that the 
non-provision of benefits is unconstitutional if motivated by bad reasons, and 
the task becomes one of identifying the reasons that count as bad.  Here’s a 
rough-cut proposal: government may not withhold benefits it would 
otherwise provide for the purpose either of discouraging agents from 
exercising their constitutional rights or of punishing them for doing so.170  
Stated differently, if government has reasons to provide a particular benefit 
to a particular potential beneficiary, it may not withhold that benefit in order 
to make the exercise of constitutional rights costly or painful.  Let us try to 
convert these general thoughts into a definition of penalty, formulated as a 
specification of P: 
P*: Any governmental act or omission, G, penalizes (i.e., 
imposes a penalty upon) some conduct, C, by an actor, A, if 
G makes C more costly for A than C would have been for A 
had the government not undertaken G and if the government 
engaged in G, rather than not-G, for the purpose of making C 
more costly or painful. 
Please take P* as a work in progress.  Very likely, it can be improved 
upon.  The core idea, again, is that if government could have made C less 
costly than it did make C, but did not choose that path because of—and not 
in spite of—its anticipation that its action would prove costly to A 
(presumably, for deterrent or punitive reasons), then its pursuit of the more 
costly-to-A path imposes a penalty on A’s doing of C.  Put in the language of 
reasons, the state may not take the expected fact that a proposed course of 
action would make the exercise of rights more costly or more painful as a 
reason in favor of that course of action.  (More costly or more painful than 
what?  More costly or more painful than would be the case if the state did 
otherwise.) 
Two things about P* merit emphasis.  First, it is not the case that, on 
this definition, all withholdings of benefits amount to a penalty.  The 
University of Texas School of Law, a state actor, offers a faculty position to 
Lucy Taylor, conditioned on her agreement to teach tax.  She declines, as is 
her constitutional right.  In response, UT carries out its threat not to employ 
 
169. This objection is not original to me.  See, e.g., John H. Garvey, The Powers and Duties of 
Government, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209, 224 (1989) (noting that it is often said that the 
government cannot withhold benefits for a bad reason). 
170. By acting “in order to punish” or “for the purpose of punishing,” I mean that one acts on 
vindictive or retributive non-instrumental reasons for imposing costs or hardship. 
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her.  This non-provision of a benefit need not be tainted by any purpose that 
renders it a penalty.  That withholding the job would make Taylor’s exercise 
of her right not to teach tax more costly or painful need play no role in the 
Law School’s deliberation.  It may simply be that the Law School has 
inadequate affirmative reason to employ Taylor if doing so would not fill its 
curricular needs.171 
Second, that some action by the state does penalize some conduct is not 
enough to render the state action suspect.  Some conduct the state is entirely 
free to penalize.  Criminal punishments are penalties on the proposed 
account, for the state imposes them to make the proscribed conduct more 
costly or painful than it would be otherwise, and does so for the purpose of 
discouraging and/or punishing it.172  But they are unproblematic precisely to 
the extent that people do not have a right to engage in the conduct 
criminalized and thus penalized.  The claim—represented by AP—is that the 
state is obligated not to penalize the exercise of rights.  Part of what it is to 
have a constitutional right to φ is to have a right not to be penalized for 
φing—in the sense of penalty captured by P*.173  Thus, combining the anti-
penalty principle, AP, with P* as the specification of what a penalty is yields 
the following principle: 
AP*: It is presumptively unconstitutional for the government to 
make the exercise of a constitutional right more costly for 
the right holder than it would be had the government acted 
otherwise where the government would have acted otherwise 
but for a purpose of making the exercise of the right more 
costly or painful. 
I have now formulated the suggestion in a variety of ways that 
approximate one another even if they don’t correspond precisely.174  I have 
not yet provided argument for it.  I do not believe that any slam-dunk 
argument in favor of it exists.  For example, AP* cannot be deduced from 
incontrovertible first principles or even from principles that, if controvertible, 
are not in fact contested.  The best argument for AP* must be largely 
coherentist: First, AP* is highly plausible on its face.  Second, AP* best 
 
171. I am assuming that the Law School would not want to hire Taylor if she could not, or 
would not, teach tax.  But the case could be otherwise.  The Law School might deem Taylor a 
sufficiently attractive candidate to warrant hiring her regardless of her curricular commitments.  In 
that case, the conditional offer would be extended as a way to pressure or induce her to teach a 
subject that would make her yet more attractive.  For a discussion of this possibility, see infra 
Part V, Objection 6.  I am grateful to David Strauss for pressing me on just this point. 
172. Again, see supra note 170 for what I mean by the “purpose” of “punishing.” 
173. Not all rights are rights to φ. I mean the claim in text to accommodate these other types of 
rights too. 
174. One respect in which the formulations differ concerns how the bad purposes or reasons 
function in the state’s deliberation—in particular, whether the reasons I identify turn the 
withholding of a benefit into a penalty only if they serve a but-for role, or if they serve any 
motivating function, or are “substantial factors,” and so on.  See Berman, supra note 19, at 27 & 
n.103.  I leave this an open question for now. 
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accounts for widespread intuitions about a wide range of cases, actual and 
hypothetical, and for judgments about cases that, if not immediately intuitive, 
withstand critical scrutiny.175 
The latter claim cannot be fully demonstrated in this Article, given the 
number and diversity of cases that a coherentist analysis would have to 
address.  I have, however, taken a stab at the project elsewhere.176  Here, I 
can proceed only some distance toward establishing the plausibility and 
attractiveness of AP*.  As a first step, let us consider two hypothetical cases, 
what I will call Vindictive Sentencing and Short Zoning. 
Vindictive Sentencing 
Harris is convicted of robbery, a second-degree felony punishable under 
state law by a sentence of imprisonment from two to twenty years.  Judge 
Davis imposes a sentence of ten years.  Harris appeals his conviction on the 
grounds that a motion to exclude certain eyewitness testimony was 
improperly denied.  The court of appeals agrees and vacates the conviction.  
Harris is convicted on retrial and once again comes before Judge Davis for 
sentencing.  This time, however, Judge Davis imposes a sentence of twenty 
years.  She explains this longer sentence in open court: “We simply cannot 
have guilty people challenging this court’s orders with impunity.” 
Short Zoning 
The three-member local land use commission is considering what 
zoning restrictions to impose on beachfront property.  Commissioners Smith 
and Jones observe that height limits of forty feet would adequately serve the 
community’s environmental and aesthetic interests.  Commissioner Brown, 
speaking last, agrees.  But he also observes that a thirty-foot limit would 
allow the Commission to extract concessions from homeowners in exchange 
for permission to build up to forty feet.  “Good point,” says Commissioner 
Smith.  “Brilliant,” adds Commissioner Jones.  They vote unanimously to 
limit beachfront property to thirty vertical feet. 
After the new zoning rules go into effect, the Johnsons, owners of a 
beachfront lot, seek a variance from the height restrictions that would allow 
 
175. Note that I do not maintain that the conjunction of AP and P* perfectly accounts for 
widespread intuitions about a wide range of cases.  Some of my conclusions with regard to actual 
cases differ from what the courts have held; some may differ from your own intuitions.  The method 
of reflective equilibrium requires that we be willing to abandon some of those case-specific 
intuitions in order to produce a set of mutually supportive beliefs that we can accept on reflection 
better than any alternative set.  For elaboration, see Berman, supra note 105, at 259–61.  To be sure, 
if application of AP* yields conclusions that you are firmly convinced are mistaken, even on deep 
reflection, and if AP* really does require those conclusions (it might be supplemented, in a non-ad 
hoc way, by other principles that would save the case-specific judgment), then you are warranted in 
rejecting AP* or modifying it.  But do not expect perfect coherence at the outset.  Some of our 
judgments about individual cases might be mistaken. 
176. See generally Berman, supra note 19; Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 
VAND. L. REV. 693 (2002). 
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them to build a forty-foot home.  They argue, among other things, that a 
forty-foot house on their lot would not block their inland neighbors’ views 
and that, because nearby beachfront houses are comparably tall, their 
requested construction would not alter a uniform aesthetic.  The commission 
asks the Johnsons to grant a public easement across their beach in exchange 
for the variance.  The Johnsons refuse and the commission denies the 
variance. 
I expect readers to share the judgments that Judge Davis’s imposition of 
a twenty-year sentence violated Harris’s constitutional rights and that the 
Commission’s denial of the Johnsons’ requested variance violated their 
constitutional rights.  But why?  After all, Harris was not constitutionally 
entitled to a sentence of less than twenty years, and the Johnsons were not 
constitutionally entitled to build a forty-foot-tall house.  Constitutionally 
speaking, both were “benefits” that the state could withhold. 
The answer, I suggest, is supplied by AP*.  Harris has a constitutional 
right to appeal his conviction.  Judge Davis penalized him for exercising this 
right by denying him the benefit of a lower sentence as retribution for 
exercise of that right.  The Johnsons have a constitutional right not to have 
property taken from them without just compensation.  That is the right they 
invoke when refusing to grant a public right of access across their beach.  
The Commission penalized them for exercising their right when denying 
them a benefit for the purpose of discouraging them or similarly situated 
others from insisting on their right in like circumstances.  The combination of 
P* and AP explain why these actions are unconstitutional, as surely all agree 
that they are.177 
In fact, this analysis corresponds extraordinarily well with actual 
Supreme Court decisions that approximate Vindictive Sentencing and Short 
Zoning: North Carolina v. Pearce178 and Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission179 respectively. 
 
177. Recall Cass Sunstein’s rejection of AP.  See supra note 154.  “The clearest example” he 
can muster for the proposition that “the government can legitimately ‘penalize’ the exercise of 
constitutional rights through selective funding” is government’s funding of public but not private 
schools.  See Sunstein, Anachronism, supra note 154, at 603 & n.42, 609–10.  But the non-funding 
of private schools, even when conjoined to the funding of public schools, does not, according to P*, 
penalize parents’ right (grounded in the Free Exercise Clause) to send their children to private 
school.  That non-funding of private schools makes it harder or more costly to exercise parents’ 
rights over the education of their children need not figure into the government’s reasoning at all.  
Because public and private schooling may differ in various ways—including regarding the extent to 
which each tends to promote class and racial integration and the extent to which government can 
influence the curriculum—the state may on legitimate grounds value the former more highly than 
the latter.  Put differently, the state may decide that free education open to all members of the 
community, provided and shaped by the polity in a collective capacity, is a distinct type of good, 
and one worth providing. 
178. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
179. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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Pearce involved consolidated challenges to longer criminal sentences 
imposed after defendants successfully appealed a first conviction but were 
convicted again after retrial.180  In contrast to the hypothetical Vindictive 
Sentencing however, in neither case did the resentencing judge announce his 
reasons for the longer sentence.181  The Court started by declaring basic 
principles: 
It can hardly be doubted that it would be a flagrant violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for a state trial court to follow an announced 
practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted 
defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for his 
having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside.  Where, 
as in each of the cases before us, the original conviction has been set 
aside because of a constitutional error, the imposition of such a 
punishment, “penalizing those who choose to exercise” constitutional 
rights, “would be patently unconstitutional.”  And the very threat 
inherent in the existence of such a punitive policy would, with respect 
to those still in prison, serve to “chill the exercise of basic 
constitutional rights.”  But even if the first conviction has been set 
aside for nonconstitutional error, the imposition of a penalty upon the 
defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal 
or collateral remedy would be no less a violation of due process of 
law.  “A new sentence, with enhanced punishment, based upon such a 
reason, would be a flagrant violation of the rights of the defendant.”182 
In short, “Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against 
a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no 
part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.”183 
Because “[t]he existence of a retaliatory motivation would, of course, be 
extremely difficult to prove in any individual case,”184 the majority 
proceeded to announce that vindictiveness would be conclusively presumed 
“whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a 
new trial,” unless the reasons for the more severe sentence “affirmatively 
appear.”185  Twenty years after Pearce, in Alabama v. Smith,186 the Court 
overruled this strict prophylactic rule.187  But no Justice in the Pearce line of 
cases has disputed the general principle that a vindictive reason for giving a 
criminal defendant a longer sentence than he had received previously is 
unconstitutional even where the defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a 
 
180. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713–14. 
181. Id. at 726. 
182. Id. at 723–24 (internal citations omitted). 
183. Id. at 725. 
184. Id. at 725 n.20. 
185. Id. at 726. 
186. 490 U.S. 794 (1989). 
187. See id. at 795 (“We hold that no presumption of vindictiveness arises when the first 
sentence was based upon a guilty plea, and the second sentence follows a trial.”). 
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shorter sentence.188  Moreover, no Justice has taken issue with the Pearce 
majority’s observation that the vindictive sentence is unconstitutional 
because it amounts to a forbidden “penalty.”189 
The basic idea applies to vindictiveness outside of the criminal justice 
context.  In Perry v. Sindermann,190 for example, a teacher in the Texas state 
college system alleged that the state declined to renew his contract because, 
as president of the local teachers association, he had criticized the Board of 
Regents.191  In reasoning and language that nearly mirrors the general 
principle endorsed by Pearce, the Supreme Court reiterated that, 
even though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental 
benefit, and even though the government may deny him the benefit for 
any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the 
government may not rely.  It may not deny a benefit to a person on a 
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially 
his interest in freedom of speech.  For if the government could deny a 
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or 
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be 
penalized and inhibited.192 
Perry’s declaration that “there are some reasons upon which the 
government may not rely,” in particular that it “may not . . . deny a benefit to 
a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations” 
restates what I described as the core idea behind P*: “[T]he state may not 
take the expected fact that a proposed course of action would make the 
exercise of rights more costly or more painful as a reason in favor of that 
course of action.”193  Penalty skeptics have not given this possibility a serious 
hearing. 
Nollan is much like Short Zoning, except that it lacks a record in which 
relevant governmental actors announce that they impose more stringent 
zoning rules than they believe are necessary to serve the public interest, for 
the purpose of using the offer of a variance to extract a waiver of rights that 
the state could not mandate.  In the absence of that “smoking gun,” the 
question in Nollan became whether such a purpose could be inferred from 
the fact that the zoning rule and the extraction demanded as a condition for 
its non-enforcement served somewhat different purposes: the height 
limitation served the public’s interest in being able to see the coast from 
 
188. See id. at 798–99 (surveying and approving of cases that used the presumption of 
vindictiveness). 
189. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724. 
190. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
191. Id. at 594–95. 
192. Id. at 597. 
193. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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some distance inland; the easement served the public’s interest in being able 
to traverse the beach.194 
The Supreme Court divided, 5–4, on just this question.  A majority 
thought the purposes that would constitute a penalty—in the sense marked 
out by P*—could be inferred from the structure of the proposal: “unless the 
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development 
ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an out-
and-out plan of extortion.”195  The dissenters thought the inference 
unwarranted.196  But they did not disagree that, if denial of the requested 
permit were in fact animated by the purposes that the majority ascribed to the 
land use commission, the denial would unconstitutionally penalize the 
Nollans’ Fifth Amendment rights.197 
Notice this.  “Extortion” is fairly understood as theft by coercion.  In the 
majority’s estimation, then, the Commission’s offer to the Nollans—we’ll 
give you a construction permit if and only if you cede a lateral easement to 
the public—violated an anti-coercion principle.198  But that anti-coercion 
principle is manifestly not an anti-compulsion principle.  Suppose the 
Nollans wanted only to make a modest addition to their existing home.  The 
threat to deny permission to do so would not, in that event, give them “no 
choice” or even “no practical choice” other than to accept: they could live 
happily as they were.  Still, the threat would impermissibly threaten a 
penalty, on the majority’s estimation.  Remarkably, Nollan was decided just 
three days after Dole.199  Both cases raised the conditional offer problem, and 
both evaluated the conditional offers before them against principles fairly 
described in “anti-coercion” terms.  But the Dole “anti-coercion principle” is 
really an anti-compulsion principle, while Nollan endorsed an anti-coercion 
principle.  Nollan was on sounder normative footing. 
 
194. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987). 
195. Id. at 837 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
196. Id. at 849–50.  In my view, the dissenters had the better of the argument.  The majority’s 
assertion that “the lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building 
restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was,” id. at 837, is nonsense.  
Nonetheless, the majority’s approach might make sense if understood, not as a claim about 
metaphysics or logical deduction, but instead as a determination that the judiciary should police 
exactions by means of a judicial rule that conclusively presumes a conditional permit offer to 
threaten a penalty when the public interests served by the restriction and by the exaction differ.  
This, however, would be a prophylactic rule—what I would term a prophylactic “decision rule.”  
(On the meaning of “constitutional decision rules,” see infra note 231 and accompanying text.)  
That would be fine with me, but uncomfortable for Justice Scalia, the author of Nollan, given his 
jeremiad against prophylactic rules in his Dickerson dissent.  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428, 457–61 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
197. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that if the majority were 
correct that the regulation exceeded the state’s police power, it would be an unconstitutional taking). 
198. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “extortion” as 
“obtaining something . . . by illegal means, as by force or coercion”). 
199. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (decided on June 26th); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987) (decided on June 23rd). 
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As Pearce and Nollan illustrate, it will often be hard to determine 
whether a given non-provision of a benefit is a penalty in the sense captured 
by P*, and also, therefore, whether some conditional offer of a benefit 
threatens a penalty in that same sense.  More fundamentally, though, they 
teach that, epistemic difficulties aside, the state may not penalize rights.  
Without qualification or dissent, they affirm AP*. 
4. Beyond the Hypothetical.—The previous subsection aimed to bolster 
the plausibility of AP* by analyzing hypothetical cases in which the types of 
reasons or purposes necessary to make out a penalty were patent.  The actual 
cases that I paired with the hypotheticals raise the question of whether we 
can ever infer the bad purposes from the structure of the proposal itself, 
without having to put words into the mouths of the key governmental actors.  
I pursue that question here—and answer it in the affirmative—by analyzing 
the most important conditional spending precedent: South Dakota v. Dole. 
Dole involved a challenge to federal highway spending law that 
conditioned 5% of the funds that a state would be authorized to receive for 
highway construction and repair on its maintenance of a minimum legal 
drinking age (MLDA) of at least 21.200  The Court, recall, determined that the 
proposal was not unconstitutionally “coercive,” but interpreted “coercion” to 
mean compulsion: 
When we consider, for a moment, that all South Dakota would lose if 
she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking 
age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified highway 
grant programs, the argument as to coercion is shown to be more 
rhetoric than fact. . . .  Here Congress has offered relatively mild 
encouragement to the States to enact higher minimum drinking ages 
than they would otherwise choose.  But the enactment of such laws 
remains the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in 
fact.201 
The Court was surely right to conclude that the proposal did not 
constitute compulsion.  I have argued, however, that the normatively 
meaningful concept is coercion.  And the offer would have been coercive if it 
would have been unconstitutional for Congress to withhold the offered 
benefit (some portion of federal highway funds) on failure of the condition.  
Furthermore, given the specification of the anti-penalty provision captured 
by AP*, non-provision of that benefit would have been unconstitutional had 
it been motivated by a purpose to discourage or punish exercise of a state’s 
right to maintain a MLDA under 21. 
Keep in mind: we are inquiring into the reasons the offeror would have 
for withholding the benefit at t2 on non-satisfaction of the stated condition; 
we are not inquiring into the public-serving reasons for extending the 
 
200. 483 U.S. at 203. 
201. Id. at 211–12. 
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proposal, or for attaching this particular condition, at t1.  (This is an 
absolutely critical distinction that even sophisticated readers have missed;202 
if you glide past it, then you have no chance to understand the analysis.)  
Often, though not invariably, government is constitutionally permitted to 
offer benefits on condition precisely as a means of inducing a rightholder to 
waive the protection of a constitutional right or to exercise her right in a 
manner that the government prefers.203  The conditional spending power, plea 
bargains, and even governmental employment all depend upon this fact.  It is 
crucial, however, that in many or most cases where the deployment of such 
conditional offers is permitted, government would lack (much or any) 
affirmative reason to provide the offered benefit if the offeree refuses to 
abide by the stated condition, in which event the failure, at t2, to provide the 
offered benefit would not itself be motivated, as was the offer at t1, by a 
waiver-inducing purpose.  This is true of prosaic offers not involving the 
government too: if I offer you $10 for the shirt off your back, and if you 
decline, then what best explains my consequent failure to provide you with 
the benefit of $10 is simply that I lack an affirmative reason to provide it and 
not that I have affirmative reason to provide it but allow that affirmative 
reason to be overridden by a punitive or waiver-inducing purpose.204 
There’s a pretty simple test for determining whether the offeror would 
have acceptable reasons for withholding the benefit.  This test is imperfect 
but good as a first pass.  Imagine two things: first, that there is only a single 
offeree, not a class of them; and second, that the offeror knows that the 
offeree will not accept the deal, i.e., that it will not comply with the 
condition.  Would the offeror, if genuinely motivated to advance the public 
interest, nonetheless withhold the benefit at issue?  If so, then the 
withholding of the benefit does not penalize the offeree for exercising its 
right.  If not, then the withholding of the benefit does penalize the offeree for 
exercising its right, in which case the conditional proposal threatens an 
unconstitutional penalty, hence constitutes the constitutional wrong of 
coercion. 
A hypothetical contrasting case facilitates the analysis.205  Suppose that 
by 1984 every state had a minimum drinking age of 21, except for South Dakota, 
which maintained a legal drinking age of 18, and that each state had a minimum 
driving age of 18, except for North Dakota, which imposed a minimum driving 
age of 55.  Wanting to induce each state to change its outlying policies, Congress 
 
202. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 167, at 378 (erroneously stating that “Berman treats a 
federal funding condition as imposing a penalty whenever the law has the purpose of influencing 
the states’ behavior”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
203. When this is, and is not, a permissible purpose for governmental conduct must be 
determined by provision- or rights-specific analysis; it cannot be resolved by the principles or 
considerations that are general to a trans-substantive framework for thinking through the conditional 
offer problem. 
204. This is a profoundly important distinction.  We will return to it. 
205. This comparison first appeared in Baker & Berman, supra note 51, at 537–39. 
2013] Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion 1331 
 
 
directed that a state would lose 5% of the highway funds it would otherwise 
receive if it maintained a minimum drinking age under 21 and would lose all of 
its highway funds for imposing a minimum driving age over 18.  Both conditions 
amount to congressional threats to withhold a benefit.206 
But as I have just emphasized, that alone can’t make either proposal 
coercive.  On our best account of coercion, the proposal is coercive if 
carrying out the threat would be unconstitutional, and, per AP*, carrying out 
the threat would unconstitutionally penalize the states’ (presumed) sovereign 
right to set a drinking or driving age as it wishes if done in order to make the 
exercise of such a right costlier. 
Now imagine, though, that both Dakotas reject the conditions.  What 
interests would justify Congress in carrying out its threat to withhold highway 
funds—5% of South Dakota’s, all of North Dakota’s?  The story with respect to 
North Dakota might go like this.  The higher the minimum driving age, the 
smaller the number of cars on the roads and the smaller the number of accidents.  
If the latter numbers are very small, then improvements to road conditions could 
net only a very small reduction in accidents and their associated costs.  
Therefore, every federal dollar spent on North Dakota road improvements 
purchases a much smaller social welfare benefit than is purchased in the other 
states.  So if North Dakota (or any other state) insists on maintaining an 
unusually high minimum driving age, federal funds could produce a higher 
return in their next best use than when devoted to highway improvements in that 
state.207 
It’s all well and good for a state to maintain a very high driving age, 
Washington might therefore think, but because the highways in such states 
will be so underused, the national interest is not well-served by improving 
them.  In short, withholding the offered funds on failure of the driving-age 
condition need not serve any interest in punishing North Dakota or in shaping 
state behavior, which is to say that withholding the funds does not penalize 
North Dakota, in which event the conditional threat to withhold such funds is not 
coercive.208 
This story is rather less plausible with respect to South Dakota, 
however.209  To be sure, improving road conditions and raising the minimum 
 
206. Id. at 537. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. In the real world, of course, this story is not very plausible with respect to North Dakota 
either.  For one thing, Congress could (in fact, does) introduce annual highway miles driven into the 
ordinary formula for allocating highway funds, in which case introducing driving age as a separate 
factor would be redundant.  But this driving age hypothetical is designed merely to show that not all 
conditional spending proposals involve threats to withhold federal funds under circumstances in 
which such withholding would be undertaken for an improper reason.  It illustrates that proposition 
by showing what form a counterexample would take even if it would not itself, in all probability, 
constitute such a counterexample.  In any event, any objection to the example could be met by 
tweaking the hypothetical.  So, for example, I could ask you to imagine that the technology 
necessary to measure annual highway miles driven does not exist or is prohibitively expensive to 
employ. 
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drinking age (from 18 to 21) might each increase net social welfare.  But 
that’s not the issue.  The issue is whether the extent to which improving road 
conditions increases net social welfare is itself contingent upon the minimum 
drinking age.  Put another way, the issue is whether the increase in highway 
safety that Congress would buy by giving a state funds with which to 
improve its highways varies depending upon that state’s minimum drinking 
age, such that the higher a state’s MLDA (within the relevant range), the 
greater is the increase in highway safety that federal highway dollars 
purchase.  Because if it doesn’t, then withholding federal highway funds on 
failure of the condition does not serve a legitimate federal interest except as 
mediated by a purpose—the type of purpose that turns a permissible non-
provision of a benefit into an impermissible imposition of a penalty—to 
discourage states from refusing the federal demand.  That is, if $X spent on 
highway maintenance and construction would reduce highway accidents (or 
injuries or accident costs) y regardless of whether the state has an MLDA of 
18 or 21 (albeit from different baselines), then Congress’s non-provision of 
some portion of that $X because a state maintains the lower MLDA is only 
intelligible as a means to punish the recalcitrant state or to discourage other 
states from similarly refusing the federal condition. 
All of this is put conditionally.  So, what are the facts?  Are road 
improvements less valuable in states with lower drinking ages, all else equal?  
It is hard to imagine why they would be.  If anything, it is more plausible to 
suppose that road improvements buy marginally greater decreases in 
accidents where driving conditions are more dangerous, such as where a 
greater percentage of drivers are impaired.  In any event, nothing in Dole or 
the relevant legislative history suggests even remotely that any member of 
the Court or of Congress believed road improvements are of less value in 
states with lower drinking ages.  The conclusion is thus warranted, if not 
quite inescapable, that withholding highway funds from South Dakota served 
a purpose in punishing or discouraging the exercise of a state’s right to set its 
own MLDA.  The action that Congress’s offer threatened would therefore 
violate the anti-penalty principle, and the threat itself would thus violate the 
anti-coercion principle.  Dole was wrongly decided. 
While I do not find this conclusion jarring, I know from conversation 
that some constitutional scholars find the correctness of Dole much harder to 
give up.  I would simply urge readers who share that view to reconsider.  As 
a spur to reconsideration, the reader whose sympathies run more liberal and 
more nationalist than do those of most critics of either Dole or the Affordable 
Care Act might reflect on two hypotheticals: (1) Congress conditions some 
(significant) percentage of federal funds for education on a state’s continued 
criminalization of marijuana use, either generally or for medical purposes; 
and (2) Congress conditions some (significant) percentage of federal funds 
for economic development projects on a state’s elimination or non-adoption 
of laws that prohibit discrimination in the private sector on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  It is reasonably clear that both laws would pass muster 
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under Dole.210  Granted, this is not an argument against Dole.  But some 
readers may find that it pumps anti-Dole intuitions. 
More generally, our task, as I see it, is to distill general constitutional 
principles that seem plausible on their own and that best explain and justify a 
large set of intuitions that survive reflection about the proper resolution of a 
large set of conditional offer cases.  Our goal should be to articulate and 
refine a set of general principles that best cohere with case law, with 
intuitively sensible outcomes across the unconstitutional conditions space, 
and with yet more general normative principles that seem plausible and 
attractive and that have explanatory power in their domains, all while 
keeping in mind that the principles that cohere “best” might still cohere 
imperfectly.  As in any exercise designed to achieve reflective equilibrium, 
we must be prepared to give up some intuitions with which we start.  With 
that in mind, it’s not as though analysis that begins with a philosophically 
defensible interpretation of the anti-coercion principle and with a conception 
of penalty that vindicates an anti-penalty principle yields conclusions that 
undermine McCulloch or Marbury or Brown.  Let us not treat Dole as 
sacrosanct.  It can be abandoned.211 
B. The Three-Offer Analysis 
We now have most of the tools necessary to determine whether the 
Medicaid expansion is unconstitutionally coercive on the grounds that it 
threatens to penalize the exercise of the state’s constitutional rights.  I 
propose to address that question in two steps.  In this section, I analyze the 
proposal as the Chief Justice did, namely as a new program distinct from the 
rest of Medicaid.  In the next, I investigate whether this is the best or fairest 
way to parse the Medicaid expansion and, if not, what should be the 
constitutional bottom line. 
What does it mean to view the Medicaid expansion as a new program, 
distinct from the rest of Medicaid?  It means, I think, that the entire bundle is 
 
210. These hypothetical statutes would easily satisfy four of the Dole requirements, at least 
under present doctrine: they are for the general welfare and unambiguous; they do not violate any 
independent constitutional bar; and they do not pass the point at which pressure becomes 
compulsion.  They would also pass the germaneness prong so long as Congress could identify a 
purpose for the condition that “bear[s] some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending.”  
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).  That would be child’s play.  
(1) Decriminalization of marijuana is objectionable in part because it is likely to increase marijuana 
use by minors, thus impeding their intellectual development; the condition and the funding are both 
geared toward improving children’s intellectual development.  (2) Private anti-discrimination laws 
are objectionable (even if justifiable, all things considered) in part because they cause risk-averse 
private actors to take economically inefficient precautions against liability; the condition and the 
funding are both geared toward promoting economic growth.  For elaboration on the ease with 
which Dole’s relatedness prong can be satisfied, see Baker & Berman, supra note 51, at 499–503. 
211. But what if Dole was rightly decided?  How far, wonders Glenn Cohen in private 
correspondence, can readers who would not abandon Dole despite my analysis follow me?  It’s 
impossible to say.  It all depends upon the particular reasons one has for finding my analysis of 
Dole unpersuasive. 
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properly conceptualized as consisting of three biconditional proposals.  In 
simplified and stylized form, they are as follows: 
Proposal 1 (the preexisting Medicaid program): We (the federal 
government) will give you (a state) $X for the medical needs of the blind, the 
disabled, the elderly, and needy families with dependent children in your 
state if and only if you comply with various conditions, C1 (that we are 
disabled from mandating). 
Proposal 2 (the new Medicaid expansion): We (the federal government) 
will give you (a state) $Y for the medical needs of the childless poor adults if 
and only if you comply with various conditions, C2 (that we are disabled 
from mandating). 
Proposal 3 (an ACA requirement): We (the federal government) will 
make you (a state) eligible to receive and thus to accept Proposal 1 if and 
only if you accept Proposal 2. 
To contend, as the state challengers did, that the Medicaid expansion is 
unconstitutional because it threatens to withdraw all Medicaid funding from 
states that do not agree to the conditions on receipt of funds for a new class 
of beneficiaries is just to contend that Proposal 3 is unconstitutional.  Given 
AP*, the constitutionality of Proposal 3 depends on the reasons the federal 
government would have for withdrawing a state’s eligibility to accept 
Proposal 1 in the event that it does not accept Proposal 2.212  In particular, 
Proposal 3 would unconstitutionally penalize a state’s supposed 
constitutional right to decline Proposal 2213 if carrying out the action 
threatened would be animated by a purpose in making the exercise of that 
right more costly or painful.  (Hence solutions to the second and third 
puzzling features of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion—what I termed the 
Reasons Riddle and the Penalty Puzzle: whether the Medicaid expansion 
abridged the anti-coercion principle depends upon whether it threatened to 
penalize the states’ rights, and whether the act threatened would amount to a 
penalty depends upon the reasons or purposes fairly ascribable to Congress.) 
Surely Congress would have the proscribed purposes were it to carry 
out the act that Proposal 3 (call this “the Linking Proposal”) threatens.214  
Even if not constitutionally obligated to do so, Congress has good and 
 
212. “Depends” is a little too strong.  Conceivably, Proposal 3 could be unconstitutional even if 
it does not threaten a penalty and hence isn’t coercive.  See supra note 19.  In this case, though, no 
other basis for its unconstitutionality seems remotely likely. 
213. See supra note 20. 
214. “Wired” plea bargains in which a plea bargain offered one defendant is conditioned not 
only on her pleading guilty, but also on her co-defendant accepting a plea bargain offered him, can 
also be analyzed as two separate conditional offers supplemented by a linking proposal.  Whether 
the linking proposal in wired plea bargains is unconstitutionally coercive for threatening to penalize 
a defendant’s constitutional right to put the state to its burden of proof is a separate question that I 
do not address here, except to register my disagreement with the D.C. Circuit’s observation that the 
answer to this question reduces to “whether the practice of plea wiring is so coercive as to risk 
inducing false guilty pleas.”  U.S. v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  I am grateful to 
Dan Markel for drawing the practice, and the case, to my attention. 
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legitimate reasons for granting a state funds to provide for the medical needs 
of disabled persons, blind persons, and poor families with children.  These 
reasons are essentially ones of humanity or beneficence.215  Now suppose 
that some state—Florida, let’s say—chooses not to comply with the 
conditions (C2) necessary to receive additional federal funds earmarked for 
the medical needs of poor, childless adults.  It is hard to imagine how that 
fact cancels or weakens the reasons Congress has to provide the funds 
described in Proposal 1.  The blind, disabled, and poor children in Florida are 
just as in need of public medical assistance and just as deserving (however 
needy or deserving that might be), regardless of Florida’s decision with 
respect to Proposal 2.  Therefore, the conclusion is nearly irresistible that the 
federal government’s purpose (or, if you prefer, a purpose fairly attributable 
to the federal government) for withholding the benefit of eligibility for 
Proposal 1 on failure of Florida to comply with the condition in Proposal 3 is 
to make it costly for Florida to exercise its constitutional right to decline 
Proposal 2, thereby inducing it to change its decision or discouraging other 
states from following Florida’s example.  On our best rendering of the anti-
penalty principle—the rendering captured by AP*—that is simply not a 
permissible reason for the government to treat a rightholder less well than it 
otherwise would. 
If the analysis in the preceding paragraph is correct, and if the Medicaid 
expansion is fairly viewed as a new and distinct program, we are almost 
ready to conclude that the Medicaid expansion is unconstitutionally coercive 
for unconstitutionally threatening to penalize a state’s exercise of its 
constitutional rights.  Almost, but not fully.  I said two paragraphs ago that, 
given AP*, Proposal 3 would unconstitutionally penalize a state’s supposed 
constitutional right to decline Proposal 2 if carrying out the action threatened 
would be animated by a purpose in making the exercise of that right more 
costly or painful.  That is not exactly what AP* says.  The anti-penalty 
principle speaks in terms of “presumptive” unconstitutionality.  That is, 
penalizing rights is pro tanto or defeasibly unconstitutional, but potentially 
justifiable.  In a familiar vocabulary, to penalize a right is to infringe the right 
but not necessarily to violate it.  It is therefore open to defenders of the ACA 
to argue that even if carrying out the threat contained in Proposal 3 penalizes 
a state’s constitutional rights, doing so is justified by the national 
 
215. I reiterate that it is essential to distinguish two situations in which the national government 
does not provide an offered benefit after a state executes its constitutionally protected decision not 
to comply with a stated condition.  See supra note 204 and accompanying text.  In the first, the 
failure of the condition leaves the national government without affirmative reason to provide the 
benefit; in the second, the national government has affirmative reason(s) to provide the benefit 
notwithstanding failure of the stated condition but allows such reason(s) to be overridden by 
countervailing reasons.  In the first type of case, withholding the benefit will not penalize exercise 
of the right.  In the second, withholding the benefit will penalize exercise of the right if the 
overriding reason involves a purpose to make the state’s exercise of its constitutionally protected 
decision more costly. 
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government’s weighty interests in improving the provision of health care in 
this country by making it more effective and less expensive. 
The extent to which (a) the threat to penalize a state’s constitutional 
prerogatives would in fact advance this national interest and (b) this national 
interest could not be advanced comparably well by means that do not call 
forth a demand for heightened justification are matters that depend upon 
messy empirical assumptions and causal hypotheses; they cannot be 
thoroughly evaluated from the comfort of a constitutional theorist’s armchair.  
Therefore, I will content myself with two observations.  First, the dispute 
would no longer be about whether the Medicaid expansion is coercive in a 
constitutionally meaningful sense—by hypothesis, it is—but about whether it 
is justifiably coercive.  Second, however we should assess whether the 
justificatory burden is satisfied, whether by the compelling-interest test or 
otherwise, it cannot be enough that the Medicaid expansion serves valuable 
ends.  The whole point of anti-penalty and anti-coercion principles is that 
constitutional rights impose significant constraints on the means that the state 
may adopt even in pursuit of good goals.  I am highly skeptical that this 
coercion can be justified, but acknowledge that the question should be 
considered open—though, in my view, only ajar. 
C. A Package Deal—Or Not? 
I think it fairly plain that the Medicaid expansion at least infringes a true 
anti-coercion principle when conceived as the conjunction of three 
conditional proposals.  This explains why Chief Justice Roberts took pains to 
describe the Medicaid expansion as a new and distinct program.216  This 
section addresses whether his conclusion really did depend, as he seemed to 
believe it did, upon his contested characterization of the Medicaid expansion.  
We can break this fundamental question into two subordinate ones: First, 
assuming arguendo that the Medicaid expansion is unconstitutionally 
coercive if fairly viewed as a new program, is it also unconstitutionally 
coercive if fairly viewed only as a modification of, or amendment to, the 
existing Medicaid program?  Second, if not, how do we adjudicate the 
dispute between the majority and Justice Ginsburg regarding how the 
Medicaid expansion is “properly viewed”?217  (Notice that, no matter our 
answers to these two questions, we have a good solution to the first of the 
three puzzles identified in Part III—the Modification Mystery.  Whether the 
Medicaid expansion is separate from the rest of Medicaid seemed clearly 
irrelevant on anti-compulsion reasoning.  It looks likely to be relevant on 
anti-coercion reasoning even if careful analysis persuades us that it isn’t.) 
 
216. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) 
(stating that “the expansion accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree”). 
217. Id. at 2605. 
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Although this is a natural way to proceed, I think it will turn out not to 
be felicitous.  There is no metaphysical truth regarding whether some set of 
benefits offered on some set of conditions is one program or a combination 
of programs each constituted by some subset of all benefits offered on some 
subset of all the conditions.218  My instinct is to formulate the question in 
normative rather than metaphysical terms.  In particular, we should ask 
whether, even allowing Congress to designate any bundle of offers as a 
single program, a state challenger should be entitled to insist that courts 
analyze the program as smaller conditional offers, in which acceptance of 
one serves as an additional condition for another, on the model employed in 
the previous section.  We can call this the disaggregation problem. 
A solution to the problem starts by acknowledging that neither polar 
position is tenable.  On the one hand, an offeree cannot have carte blanche to 
carve programs as it sees fit.  Consider the employment context.  Simplified, 
the deal proposed by a state employer to a would-be employee is: “If you 
agree to conditions a, b, c, d, e, and f, we agree to give you $X.”  If the 
employee were permitted to disaggregate this bundled offer into separate 
conditional offers, we’d be forced to allocate percentages of $X to each 
condition, and I see no good way to do that.  Medicaid itself (even putting the 
ACA expansion aside) is an extraordinarily complex program that could be 
parsed as a bundle of hundreds or thousands of analytically distinct 
conditional offers.  On the other hand, the governmental offeror does not 
have unlimited freedom to bundle discrete deals into one massive deal.  
Surely Congress could not lump all its present conditional spending deals 
(for education, highways, Medicaid, etc.) into a single “Super Program” that 
offered a huge sum in exchange for compliance with a vastly large set of 
conditions.  To allow that gambit would be to eviscerate any in-principle 
limit on the federal government’s ability to manipulate states into doing its 
bidding.  Perhaps that would be a better system, but it is disingenuous to 
contend that such a system would be faithful to the interests or values that 
underlie our system of federalism.  Unfortunately, while neither extreme 
position is acceptable, no test or standard for navigating between the poles 
presents itself as obvious.219  I am disposed to believe that the disaggregation 
problem is genuinely hard.220 
 
218. Compare an observation made earlier: instead of asking, following the lead of Robert 
Nozick, whether some biconditional proposal itself is a threat or an offer, we should ask whether the 
conditional threat that is one component of the proposal is wrongfully coercive.  See supra note 55 
and accompanying text. 
219. “Germaneness” or “relatedness” reasoning won’t do the trick.  See Baker & Berman, supra 
note 51, at 512–17. 
220. For other recognition of both the importance and difficulty of the problem, see Richard H. 
Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS 
L.J. 711, 736–41 (1994). 
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A preliminary step toward proposing a solution is to identify the 
potentially relevant factors or considerations.221  Here are several: 
(1) whether the provisions that constitute the putative single program were 
adopted all at once or separately; (2) the extent to which the type and amount 
of benefit can be allocated to distinct conditions or groups of conditions 
objectively or, instead, would be arbitrary or require inescapably contestable 
judgments; (3) the extent to which realization of the purposes behind one 
disaggregated conditional offer depends upon satisfaction of a separate 
disaggregated conditional offer; and (4) the extent to which allowing the 
offerees to pick and choose among conditions would burden administration 
of the program.  If these and other candidate factors point in the same 
direction with respect to any specific proposal to disaggregate what the 
offeror would present as a single program, then courts may provisionally 
resolve that particular dispute while deferring to a later case the more 
difficult work of determining just which of these factors are relevant and just 
how they should be combined—in a multi-factored balancing test or in 
something more rule-like. 
In the case of the Medicaid expansion, all four of these factors 
seemingly do point in the same direction—in support of disaggregation.  
(1) The Medicaid expansion was enacted after a coherent program (itself the 
product of many statutes over many years) already existed.222  (2) It clearly 
identifies the new conditions that must be satisfied to receive new dollars.223  
(3) The medical needs of each class of beneficiaries can be served whether or 
not a state agrees to serve the needs of other classes.224  (4) Allowing states to 
opt out of the expansion would not appear to create substantial administrative 
difficulties for the Department of Health and Human Services.225 
If I am correct that each factor by itself weighs in favor of 
disaggregation, then states should be entitled to have courts analyze the 
 
221. For the moment, I’ll pass over whether a given factor is relevant causally or constitutively, 
on the one hand, or merely evidentiarily, on the other. 
222. See Medicaid: A Timeline of Key Developments, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/timeline/pf_entire.htm (describing the various statutes that have 
impacted the Medicaid program over the years). 
223. See KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN & EVELYNE P. BAUMRUCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE EFFECT OF NFIB V. SEBELIUS ON THE MEDICAID EXPANSION 
REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 2001 OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/aca_medicaid_expansion_memo_1.pdf  (stating that the 
allocation of federal funds depends upon whether states meet the ordinary Medicaid standards or 
meet the higher standards established by the ACA). 
224. Id. 
225. The Congressional Budget Office’s estimates, updated after the Health Care Decision, do 
not address administrative costs, indicating that those costs are not substantial.  See CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 5 n.9 (2012), available at  
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-
CoverageEstimates.pdf (the updated estimates “do not include federal discretionary administrative 
costs, which will be subject to future appropriation action”). 
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conditional offers as discussed in the previous section even if Justice 
Ginsburg gets the better of Chief Justice Roberts in their debate over whether 
the Medicaid expansion “is in reality a new program”226 (and assuming that 
that is a meaningful question).  Tentatively and provisionally, then, courts 
should analyze the Medicaid expansion as the trio of offers described in the 
previous section, and should therefore accept the conclusion already 
advanced: the ACA threatens to penalize the states’ right to decline to 
provide health coverage for a new class of beneficiaries, and thus runs afoul 
of the normatively meaningful “anti-coercion principle.” 
There is another possible way to resolve the disaggregation problem that 
similarly avoids the need for courts to resolve whether some cluster of 
benefits and conditions is “in reality” one program or more, but is more 
structured, less impressionistic.  At the first stage of analysis, courts should 
allow an offeree to disaggregate a putative program into distinct conditional 
offers in whatever fashion it chooses so long as it provides persuasive 
grounds for linking the benefits and demands as it does.  Imagine a program 
that offers benefits {B1, B2, . . . Bn} to states that agree to conditions {C1, 
C2, . . . Cn}.  If the state offeree is willing to comply with all conditions 
except C2 and proposes to decouple the conditional offer of benefit B1 on 
condition C2, in order to comply with the complex conditional offer that 
remains, it must explain why C2 pairs with B1 and not with, for example, 
B2.  This is essentially to treat factor (2) as a threshold requirement. 
If the offeree can pass this threshold, then the second stage of analysis 
directs courts to evaluate the program in disaggregated form.  In particular, it 
directs them to determine whether “the Linking Proposal” is coercive—a 
question that, I have argued, depends on the reasons the offeror (the federal 
government in cases of conditional offers to the states) would have for 
carrying out the threat to deny eligibility for the conditional offer that 
remains after decoupling.  It is at this second stage that factors (3) and (4) 
become relevant.  If a state’s noncompliance with condition C2 either would 
frustrate the interests that compliance with conditions except for C2 would 
otherwise serve (i.e., if complementarity among conditions obtains), or 
would create significant administrative difficulties, then it is not the case that 
the offeror, in carrying out the Linking Proposal threat to withhold benefits, 
would act for the purpose of making it costly for states to exercise their 
supposed rights to decline condition C2.  It strikes me as reasonably clear 
that the Medicaid expansion would not survive this more structured analysis. 
 
226. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (Roberts, C.J.).  Compare id. 
at 2605–06 (Roberts, C.J.) with id. at 2635–36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (illustrating the 
difference between Roberts’s view of the expansion as a new program and Ginsburg’s opposing 
view).  Roberts’s characterization of the Medicaid expansion and its relationship to the history of 
amendments to the Medicaid program is powerfully criticized in Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging 
into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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In any event, given the centrality of reasons to my analysis, the most 
fundamental point can be simply encapsulated: “We insist on the Linking 
Proposal because that is what the program requires” is not an adequate 
response by the federal government to a state requesting disaggregation.  In 
our ordinary lives, we treat that as a “bureaucratic” answer, in the pejorative 
sense, and rightly reject it with exasperation.  We should reject it in this 
context too. 
V. Frequently Advanced Challenges (FACs) 
In this final Part, I raise and respond to the objections to my analysis 
that I have encountered most often.  Some of these objections are simply 
mistaken.  Others helpfully invite clarification or qualification that I have 
reserved for this stage. 
Objection 1: “Your analysis depends on the assumption that the 
constitutionality of state action can depend upon the reasons or purposes for 
which a legislature acts.  But the Constitution does not police purposes.” 
Response: Oh, please.  Of course it does, as many commentators have 
repeatedly and persuasively shown.227  The best way to read most decisions 
that state or suggest otherwise is as declaring not that the constitutionality of 
legislative or executive action cannot depend upon the reasons, purposes, or 
motives that lie behind the challenged action,228 but rather that courts ought 
not to inquire into those reasons, purposes, or motives.  (This is sometimes 
clear enough from the opinion itself, but sometimes requires a little charity in 
interpretation.) 
The distinction lies at the heart of what I have elsewhere dubbed the 
“two-output thesis.”229  On this picture of the logic of constitutional 
adjudication, courts do two things in constitutional adjudication upstream 
from announcing a fact-specific holding: they interpret the Constitution to 
yield a legal norm or proposition; and they craft rules or tests—doctrine—to 
 
227. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1784 
(2008); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297 
(1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 71–73 (1997) (analyzing constitutional inquiries into 
legislative purposes). 
228. I have been speaking of actions and reasons (and kindred notions) as distinct things: there 
is an action of not providing a benefit and there are reasons, purposes, or motives for which an actor 
(here, Congress or “the national government”) might engage in that action.  But it is also possible to 
inscribe reasons or purposes within the actions themselves, in which case we could isolate the action 
of (for example) not providing a benefit for the purpose of making the state’s choice more costly.  
On this view, instead of asking about Congress’s reasons for withholding the benefit, it would be 
more perspicuous to inquire into the “internal logic” of the withholding, or of the proposal.  This 
point warrants further development; at present, I simply flag it. 
229. See Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 220 (2006). 
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implement or administer that legal norm or proposition.230  I have called the 
courts’ interpreted constitutional norm “a constitutional operative 
proposition,” and the tests that courts craft and lay down for future courts to 
apply when determining whether the operative proposition is satisfied 
“constitutional decision rules.”231  But whatever the vocabulary and 
underlying conceptual framework, whether courts should police legislative or 
executive reasons, purposes, or motives is a separate question from whether 
such deliberative inputs can bear constitutively on the constitutionality of the 
governmental action.  In general, we should think first in terms of what the 
Constitution, rightly interpreted, allows, commands, and prohibits.  Only 
once we have a good handle on that, in my view, should we address what 
sensibly implementing judicial doctrine would look like. 
Objection 2: “You rely upon a contested definition of ‘penalty.’  I don’t 
think that ‘penalty’ is best defined as P* defines it.” 
Response: It is true that I believe that I have deployed an understanding 
of the concept of penalty that corresponds fairly well with the ordinary 
definition of “penalty.”  (The same is true with respect to coercion and 
“coercion.”)  But, as I have urged, that is not essential.  Don’t fixate on the 
words. 
The substance of my claim is that it is unconstitutional to make exercise 
of a right more costly than it would be but for a purpose in discouraging or 
punishing exercise of the right.  I then call the italicized phenomenon a 
“penalty.”  Though I believe this is an account that accords reasonably well 
with existing usage of the word, nothing turns on it.  If you balk at that 
concept as a definition of our current word “penalty,” fine.232  I am once 
again after a concept or normative principle; I’m not playing at lexicography.  
That conventional meaning of the word “penalty” is of little import is 
reflected by the fact that AP* does not even use it. 
Objection 3: “Your view denies that Congress may pursue ends through 
conditional spending that it could not pursue directly and thus would return 
 
230. The earliest presentations of this basic view are Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 
1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975), and Lawrence G. 
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1212 (1978).  See also, e.g., Fallon, supra note 227; Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional 
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005). 
231. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2004).  I explore the particular use of non-standard decision rules to administer operative 
propositions that turn on governmental purposes in Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: 
Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1518–33 (2004) 
(discussing Commerce Clause doctrine), and Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 
TEXAS L. REV. 781, 828–53 (2005) (discussing partisan gerrymandering). 
232. Concededly, if the activity that I label penalty is too distant from ordinary usage of the 
word “penalty,” then I am not entitled to gain support for my view from the penalty passage I quote 
from Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion.  I think that I am in fact entitled to some mileage from his 
passage, but I can do without it. 
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us to the discredited doctrine of United States v. Butler233 that Congress may 
not use its spending power to “purchase a compliance which Congress is 
powerless to command.”234 
Response: No, my analysis does not revive Butler.  Congress may try to 
induce behavior that it could not mandate by offering inducements just so 
long as it would have adequate reasons not to provide the benefits offered in 
the event that a state offeree declines the deal—reasons that do not depend 
upon the expectation that non-provision of the offered benefit would prove 
costly or painful to the offeree.  I provided a hypothetical example in my 
discussion of Dole.235  Proposals 1 and 2, in the disaggregated analysis of the 
ACA, are additional examples. 
Objection 4: “Your analysis assumes that states are right holders.  But it 
is a mistake to equate the putative ‘rights’ held by states with the genuine 
‘rights’ held by individuals.  Even if the Constitution is rightly interpreted to 
obligate government not to penalize the exercise of true rights, Congress is 
not similarly disabled from penalizing actions by states.” 
Response: My specification of the anti-penalty principle—AP*—posits 
that it follows from the possession of a constitutional right that the 
correlative duty-holder may not burden the right for certain reasons.  
Objection 4 can be construed to make two contentions: first, that, even if this 
is true of claim-rights, it is not true of those nominal rights that, in 
Hohfeldian terms, are privileges;236 and second, that the “rights” that states 
have against the federal government are in fact privileges, not claim-rights.  
Whereas claim-rights correlate with duties, privileges correlate with 
disabilities. 
I do not know what argument would support the first part of this 
contention.  It seems to me more plausible that AP* is a corollary of 
privileges and of claim-rights.  But perhaps “concomitant” is more apt than 
“corollary” here: I do not contend that AP* either is part of the concept of a 
right or is logically entailed by the possession of a right.  So the grounding, 
and therefore the scope, of AP* warrants further investigation, leaving me 
open to being persuaded that the Constitution is not best understood to 
protect states’ “rights,” or some subset of them, against penalization. 
Objection 5: “On your analysis, not only would the Medicaid expansion 
be invalid, but so too would aspects of the Medicaid program that preexisted 
that expansion.  To see why, consider Proposal 1 in the Three-Offer 
Analysis.  According to that Proposal, the federal government offers each 
state, conditioned on compliance with some specified demands, $X for the 
medical needs of the blind, the disabled, the elderly, and poor families with 
 
233. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
234. Id. at 70. 
235. See supra section IV(B)(4). 
236. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). 
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dependent children.  But that offer could itself be disaggregated into five 
proposals in which each of the first four is a conditional offer of funds for 
one class of beneficiaries (the blind, the disabled, etc.), and the fifth is the 
Linking Proposal that conditions state eligibility for any one of the first four 
offers on a state’s acceptance of the other three.  Thus, if the Medicaid 
expansion threatens to penalize states for exercising their presumed right to 
decline one offer, so too did the rest of Medicaid.  More generally, your 
analysis threatens wide swaths of federal spending programs that have not 
previously been suspect.”237 
Response: There is no question that the analysis I have proposed would 
threaten some conditional spending programs that had seemed unproblematic 
under Dole.  That conclusion should not by itself prove too alarming if we 
can pry ourselves from the grip of the status quo bias.  That said, there are 
several reasons why the implications of my framework for conditional 
spending programs are not as radical or far-reaching as might appear at first 
blush. 
The first two I have already touched on.  First, there is the 
disaggregation problem: many programs consisting of a bundle of 
conditional offers may not be disaggregable at a state’s behest.  Second, 
given the many difficulties and dangers that attend judicial inquiry into 
purposes, as AP* requires, courts might appropriately decide to administer 
these basic constitutional principles and understandings by means of under-
enforcing constitutional decision rules.238 
The third reason I have not yet emphasized, but it is more important 
than one might take its late appearance to signal.  As I have already stressed 
a couple of times, the withholding of a benefit on the failure of a stated 
condition will not be a penalty if the failure of the condition undermines or 
cancels whatever reason the offeror (here, the national government) would 
have to provide the benefit.  (If you don’t agree to give me your shirt, I 
simply lack reason to give you the $10 I had offered.)  That the national 
government would have some affirmative reason to provide the benefit 
notwithstanding a state’s decision not to comply with a stated condition is 
thus a necessary condition for the non-provision of the benefit to constitute a 
penalty.  What I wish to emphasize now is that this necessary condition is not 
sufficient.239  Even if Congress would have some affirmative reason to 
provide an offered benefit notwithstanding the state’s noncompliance with a 
condition, non-provision of the benefit does not amount to a proscribed 
penalty if the reasons that militate against providing the benefit, and that 
 
237. For a particularly strong expression of this objection, see Bagenstos, supra note 136, at 
35–38. 
238. I read Justice Ginsburg’s observation that “[c]ourts owe a large measure of respect to 
Congress’ characterization of the grant programs it establishes” as in essence a plea for a deferential 
decision rule.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2636 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting in part). 
239. See supra note 215, where the point is implied but not highlighted. 
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Congress treats as overriding, do not depend upon making the state’s 
exercise of its rights more costly.  And for purposes of evaluating social 
welfare programs, the most notable reasons that might fit this bill arise from 
government’s legitimate interests in not exacerbating morally meaningful 
inequalities, and in not being party to what it takes to be morally problematic 
behavior, even if constitutional. 
Both interests can be illustrated with a single hypothetical.  Suppose that 
Congress offers states federal matching funds for the purpose of combatting 
four big killers: $W for lung cancer, $X for breast cancer, $Y for heart 
disease, and $Z for HIV/AIDS.  State S agrees to accept the first three 
matching offers but not the fourth.  Naturally, Congress would not be 
expected to provide State S with $Z for HIV/AIDS prevention, and its failure 
to provide that benefit would not amount to a penalty.  But I’d go further.  I 
think it plausible that Congress could refuse to provide any of the offered 
funds on S’s refusal to provide matching funds for HIV/AIDS even though 
the national interest in combatting cancer and heart disease in State S is 
served equally well regardless of whether that state agrees to partner with 
Congress to combat HIV/AIDS.  Congress might reason that State S’s choices 
amount to morally wrongful discrimination of a sort with which it wishes not 
to be complicit.  If such reasoning is fairly attributable to Congress, then the 
overriding reason for which it acts in withholding the benefit need not 
involve punishing or discouraging State S’s exercise of its right not to 
participate in a federal-state program to combat HIV/AIDS.  In this case, 
non-provision of funds for the other diseases would not run afoul of the anti-
penalty principle.  Possibly, on reasoning much like this, many bundled 
offers that are fairly disaggregable do not threaten to penalize rights.  
(Possibly, this reasoning might even save the Medicaid expansion, though 
my instinct is to evaluate claims of this sort with a skeptical eye lest the anti-
coercion principle be too easily evaded.) 
Objection 6: “What you call ‘threatening a penalty,’ I call ‘bargaining.’  
It is a ubiquitous feature of commercial negotiation that, in an effort to secure 
a greater portion of the benefits of exchange, parties threaten not to 
consummate a deal on terms that they recognize would in fact serve their 
interests.  Consider, for example, the brief story, presented earlier, of the 
University of Texas Law School and faculty candidate Lucy Taylor.240  It 
might be that, taking opportunity costs into account, UT would genuinely 
prefer not to employ Taylor if she refuses to teach tax.  But it might be 
otherwise: the school might prefer to hire her no matter what she teaches to 
not hiring her at all, while preferring to hire her as a tax instructor most of 
all.  Similarly, it might prefer to hire her at an annual salary of $X to not 
hiring her at all, while most preferring to hire her at a salary of $X-n.  On 
your analysis, the state actor threatens to penalize Taylor’s constitutional 
 
240. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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right not to sell her labor on any particular terms if it conditions its offer of 
employment on her agreement to teach tax or to accept a salary lower than 
$X.  Yet those are implausible conclusions: surely such negotiating behavior 
is constitutionally unobjectionable.” 
Response: I agree that such negotiating behavior is constitutionally 
unobjectionable.  The state, as employer, must be entitled to bargain by 
means of threatening not to consummate a deal even on terms that exceed its 
reservation price.  This is true even though its reason to carry out its threat, in 
the event that its conditions are not accepted, would be to vindicate the 
efficacy of its threats going forward.  The difficult question, I think, concerns 
the breadth of this concession.  When neither contracting party has a claim 
on the full transactional surplus, bargaining should be licensed precisely 
because there is no good way to allocate the surplus that bypasses bargaining. 
But the relationships between the state and its citizens (or other persons 
subject to its jurisdiction), and between governments in a federal system, are 
different in varied ways from the relationships between private parties who 
contract with each other to advance their respective self-interests.  
Accordingly, one possible lesson from the employment hypothetical is that 
states are entitled, just like private parties, to haggle over transactional 
surpluses when acting essentially as private parties, i.e., when they are acting 
(more or less) as what Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine terms “market 
participants,”241 but not otherwise.  When the state, acting in its sovereign 
capacity, offers benefits to agents that hold rights against it, the interests that 
undergird the rights and the nature of the state’s relationship to its 
beneficiaries might combine to direct that the offeree does have a claim on 
the full transactional surplus.  Though the details of this argument remain to 
be worked out, I do suspect that this is at least sometimes true.  And when it 
is, we are left without reason to accept that the state must be permitted to 
bargain by means of threatening penalties. 
Furthermore, even to the extent that government, when not acting as a 
market participant, ought to be constitutionally permitted to “bargain” over 
the terms by which it distributes benefits to rightholders, it does not follow 
that it should enjoy the same latitude to threaten to withhold an offered 
benefit as do most private contracting parties.  For one thing, inequalities of 
bargaining power loom especially large here.  One plausible conclusion 
would be that government may not strive to secure greater benefits of 
exchange by threatening a penalty on terms that compel acceptance.  This is 
not to contradict anything argued in Part II.  There I argued not that 
compulsion is always normatively irrelevant, but only that it does not, by 
itself, have the normative significance that seven members of the NFIB Court 
attributed to it.242  Indeed, the contract law doctrine of coercion (see subpart 
 
241. For a good discussion, see Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption 
to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989). 
242. See supra Part II. 
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II(A)) saliently exemplifies that legal consequences might sensibly follow 
from the conjunction of coercion and compulsion. 
Objection 7: “Is your central thesis, then, that the Medicaid expansion 
was unconstitutionally coercive unless, for any of several different reasons, it 
wasn’t?  If so, shouldn’t you be embarrassed to have devoted fully 30,000 
words to this claim?” 
Response: To address these questions in reverse order: yes, and no.  
With respect to my latter answer, it bears emphasis that this paper is not 
intended as an argument that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional.  
It is intended as an analysis of the respects in which related but distinct 
normative concepts or principles—what I have labeled coercion and 
compulsion—properly bear on the constitutionality of offers of benefits 
conditioned on the recipient’s waiver or non-exercise of a constitutional 
right, with a focus on conditional spending offers issued by the federal 
government to the states.  According to the analysis I offer, some conclusions 
strike me as firm if not unassailable (like that the compulsion-centered 
reasoning that four Justices in NFIB put forth unequivocally is not sound243) 
whereas others are tentative.  If, as I believe, there exist principles and 
considerations that, when combined in the right way, are fairly described as a 
“solution” to the conditional offer problem, that solution will not be remotely 
algorithmic.  The most we can hope for of a proposed solution is, as Seth 
Kreimer counseled a generation ago, that “it at least gets the easy cases right, 
explains why the hard cases are hard, and allows argument to center on the 
appropriate factual and legal issues.”244 
Conclusion 
In National Federation of Independent Business, the Court held, 7–2, 
that the Medicaid expansion provision of the Affordable Care Act amounts to 
unconstitutional coercion.245  And it amounts to coercion, so the majority 
reasoned, because, by threatening to withhold all Medicaid funds from states 
that would decline the offer of new funds for a new class of beneficiaries, 
Congress presented states with a nominal choice that was functionally “no 
choice”—no choice because states could not rationally entertain one of the 
two nominal options.246  The new conditional offer was unconstitutionally 
coercive, in short, because it compelled states to accept.247 
The NFIB majority was half right: the Medicaid expansion probably 
was coercive in the particular sense that it compelled acceptance.  But, I have 
argued, the majority provides no good reason to believe that that sense of 
 
243. See supra subpart II(A). 
244. Kreimer, supra note 148, at 1301. 
245. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012) (joint opinion). 
246. Id. at 2574–75. 
247. Id. at 2574. 
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coercion is, all by itself, constitutionally meaningful, and there are powerful 
reasons to doubt it.  If this is right, then it might seem to follow that, contrary 
to the majority’s conclusion, the states’ challenge to the Medicaid expansion 
gains no traction from an “anti-coercion principle.”  That conclusion, 
however, would be premature.  Perhaps different meaning could be given to 
“coercion,” and perhaps the Medicaid expansion might transgress an anti-
coercion principle understood in those different terms. 
In fact, there are other senses of coercion “out there,” available for 
deployment.  Normative theorists have coalesced around one in particular.  
According to this favored sense of coercion (and to a first pass), a conditional 
proposal is coercive if it would be wrongful for the maker to do as it 
threatens.248  I have argued that the anti-coercion principle against which 
conditional offers of benefits are properly evaluated should incorporate this 
understanding of coercion (call it coercion, proper) and not the one that the 
majority employs (call it compulsion).  I have also argued that embrace of 
the premises that conditional offers (which are also, necessarily, conditional 
threats) are presumptively unconstitutional when they amount to coercion, 
and are not presumptively unconstitutional just because they amount to 
compulsion, does not—contrary to prevailing scholarly wisdom—entail that 
conditional offers of benefits to which offerees are not legally entitled can 
never be unconstitutionally coercive.  Withholding benefits can 
impermissibly penalize right holders when done in order to make exercise of 
a right costly or painful.  Not incidentally, all of this jibes with features of the 
Chief Justice’s reasoning that are hard to square with a superficial reading of 
that opinion pursuant to which compulsion does all the normative work. 
I reiterate—here beating a horse that I would hope to be well-interred by 
this point—that my analysis of federal conditional spending is not 
conditional-spending particular.  It depends upon two claims of far greater 
generality: (1) the state should not engage in the constitutional wrong of 
coercion, understood as conditionally threatening what would be 
constitutionally wrongful to do; and (2) the state may not penalize the 
exercise of constitutional rights in the sense of imposing adverse 
consequences—relative to the consequences it would otherwise impose or 
allow to obtain—for the purpose of punishing or discouraging the exercise of 
the right. 
Of course, we wish to know how these general principles apply to the 
Medicaid expansion.  I have concluded that the threat to withhold all 
Medicaid funds from states that would decline the offer of new funds for a 
new class of beneficiaries most likely does threaten to penalize the states’ 
constitutional right to decline that offer and thus amounts to impermissible 
coercion.  If so, the majority reached the right bottom line, though for the 
wrong reasons.  This conclusion, though, is not ironclad.  There are several 
 
248. See Gunderson, supra note 37, at 248 (explaining that coercion involves the threat of 
sanctions). 
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possible avenues for avoiding it consistent with acceptance of the anti-
coercion and anti-penalty principles as I have glossed them.  For example, 
perhaps it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to penalize states for 
exercising their constitutional “privileges” or prerogatives even while it is 
not permissible for any level of government to penalize individuals for 
exercising their constitutional rights.  Or perhaps a state that would accept 
Medicaid funding for some classes of beneficiaries but not for others would 
thereby exacerbate morally meaningful inequalities such that Congress might 
refuse to allow a state this choice for reasons that do not constitute a penalty. 
Because some readers will understandably hunger for a more decisive 
constitutional bottom line, I will close by recommending that consumers and 
producers of constitutional scholarship focus more keenly than is the fashion 
on general principles and concepts of normative and constitutional reasoning.  
The application of these general principles and concepts to concrete fact 
patterns will frequently depend upon contestable judgments that are 
irreducibly subjective (to some nontrivial degree) and with respect to which 
constitutional theorists may lack comparative expertise.  Accordingly, 
scholars’ insistence on trying fully to resolve difficult concrete disputes 
predictably contributes, as Mike Seidman and Mark Tushnet diagnosed some 
years ago, to “the tendentious debate that has made constitutional argument 
so unproductive in the modern period.”249 
Perhaps, then, we should worry a little less about case-specific holdings 
and a little more about the state of our normative building blocks.  Put more 
pointedly, when a court opines, say, that some action does or does not 
amount to coercion or to a penalty, then our first and most fundamental task 
is to insist, if possible, that such judgments comport with defensible accounts 
of the relevant concepts, and are applied consistently across cases and lines 
of authority (absent good reason to the contrary).  We can and should 
appraise the job courts do in wielding the tools at their disposal.  But we 
provide an even greater service by refining the tools. 
 
249. SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 167, at 77. 
